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Abstract The mechanisms of variation, selection and
inheritance, on which evolution by natural selection
depends, are not fixed over evolutionary time. Current evo-
lutionary biology is increasingly focussed on understanding
how the evolution of developmental organisations modifies
the distribution of phenotypic variation, the evolution of
ecological relationships modifies the selective environment,
and the evolution of reproductive relationships modifies the
heritability of the evolutionary unit. The major transitions in
evolution, in particular, involve radical changes in devel-
opmental, ecological and reproductive organisations that
instantiate variation, selection and inheritance at a higher
level of biological organisation. However, current evolu-
tionary theory is poorly equipped to describe how these
organisations change over evolutionary time and especially
how that results in adaptive complexes at successive scales
of organisation (the key problem is that evolution is self-
referential, i.e. the products of evolution change the param-
eters of the evolutionary process). Here we first reinterpret
the central open questions in these domains from a per-
spective that emphasises the common underlying themes.
We then synthesise the findings from a developing body of
work that is building a new theoretical approach to these
questions by converting well-understood theory and results
from models of cognitive learning. Specifically, connec-
tionist models of memory and learning demonstrate how
simple incremental mechanisms, adjusting the relationships
between individually-simple components, can produce
organisations that exhibit complex system-level behaviours
and improve the adaptive capabilities of the system. We use
the term ‘‘evolutionary connectionism’’ to recognise that, by
functionally equivalent processes, natural selection acting on
the relationships within and between evolutionary entities
can result in organisations that produce complex system-
level behaviours in evolutionary systems and modify the
adaptive capabilities of natural selection over time. We
review the evidence supporting the functional equivalences
between the domains of learning and of evolution, and dis-
cuss the potential for this to resolve conceptual problems in
our understanding of the evolution of developmental, eco-
logical and reproductive organisations and, in particular, the
major evolutionary transitions.
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The Evolution of Developmental, Ecological
and Reproductive Organisations
The Problem: Variation, Selection and Heredity are
Modified by Organisations that are Themselves
Evolved
Evolution by natural selection aims to explain biological
adaptations—such as how the giraffe came to have a long
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neck. For some purposes it is sufficient to assume that there
is, for example, variability in neck length, that long necks
confer differential survival or reproductive benefit, and that
neck length is heritable. However, research in the rapidly-
expanding fields of evolutionary developmental biology
(evo-devo), evolutionary ecology (evo-eco) and the evo-
lutionary transitions in individuality (for which we propose
the term ‘‘evo-ego’’, Watson and Szathma´ry 2015) recog-
nises that for some purposes this is only part of the
explanation. That is, evolutionary outcomes are signifi-
cantly dependent on how developmental, ecological and
reproductive organisations constrain or facilitate the vari-
ability of phenotypes, the organisation of their selective
environment and the heritability of the relevant evolu-
tionary units, respectively. For example, how is it that
developmental constraints allow multiple phenotypic traits
to change simultaneously whilst maintaining suitable func-
tional integration between them and avoiding deleterious
side-effects on other traits? What is it about the organisa-
tion of an ecological community that causes some eco-
logical relationships to remain stable over long periods of
selection and applies a strong selective pressure for chan-
ges in other ecological relationships (e.g. between a par-
ticular herbivore and a particular resource)? How is it that
reproductive constraints (e.g. reproduction through a sin-
gle-celled population bottle-neck) come to define a multi-
cellular organism like a giraffe as a Darwinian unit in the
first place—suppressing fitness differences between the
cells or genes within an individual (so they do not compete
with each other for representation in offspring individuals)
but enabling the inheritance of fitness differences between
individuals (allowing them to compete for representation in
the population)? Answering these questions requires a
move to a different level of explanation—one that attempts
to explain why variation, selection and inheritance have the
forms that they do, rather than taking them as fixed axioms
of the adaptive process.
These parameters are not simply exogenous contextual
details to the processes of evolution. Each of these
organisations (developmental, ecological and reproductive
interactions) is itself a product of evolution or is modified
by the products of evolution (Wagner and Altenberg 1996;
Odling-Smee et al. 2003, Okasha 2006; Laland et al. 2011,
2015). The phenotypic variation exhibited by a genetic
lineage is modified by the evolution of developmental
interactions (Brakefield 2006; Kirchner and Gerhart 1998;
Wagner and Altenberg 1996; Toussaint and von Seelen
2007), the selection it experiences is modified by the
evolution of ecological interactions (Post and Palkovacs
2009; Laland and Sterelny 2006; Laland et al. 1999; 2011;
Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 2013), and even the identity of
the evolutionary unit changes as a result of the evolution of
new reproductive strategies and new mechanisms of
inheritance (Jablonka and Szathma´ry 1995; Szathma´ry and
Demeter 1987; Okasha 2006; Sigmund and Szathma´ry
1998; Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry 1995). Accordingly,
each of the major components of the Darwinian machine
(namely, variation, selection and inheritance) (Lewontin
1970) are themselves subject to evolutionary change
(Watson and Szathma´ry 2015). The ambitious aim of an
extended evolutionary synthesis (Pigliucci and Muller
2010; Laland et al. 2015) can thus be seen as the aim to
endogenise these organisations into evolutionary theory
(Okasha 2006, p. 220)—explaining both how evolutionary
processes shape these organisations (evo ? devo/eco/ego)
and, in the reverse direction, how these organisations affect
evolutionary outcomes (evo / devo/eco/ego). This is not
easy to do (Pigliucci 2007; Lawton 1999; Laland et al.
2011, 2015; Okasha 2006).
In evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo)
(Brakefield 2006; Carroll 2008; Wagner and Laubichler
2004; Wagner et al. 2007; Wagner 2013; Hoekstra and
Coyne 2007) it is recognised that the organisation of devel-
opmental biases and constraints controls the distribution of
phenotypic variation that is produced under genetic (or
environmental) variation and can thereby control the possi-
ble paths of evolutionary trajectories through phenotype
space (Arnold et al. 2001; Jones et al. 2007; Schluter 1996;
Toussaint and von Seelen 2007;Gerhart andKirschner 2007;
Wagner 2014) (evo / devo). For example, some physio-
logical changes in limb morphology, wing patterns or gene-
regulatory circuits may be readily produced and selected
whereas others may not (Wagner 2014; Brakefield 2006).
The structure of this developmental organisation is itself
subject to change over evolutionary time, e.g. via the evo-
lution of gene-regulatory interactions or morphological
architectures (Riedl 1977;Draghi andWagner 2009;Wagner
and Altenberg 1996; Crombach and Hogeweg 2008;
Amundson 2005; Pavlicˇev and Cheverud 2015) (evo ?
devo). This bi-directional interaction means that evolution
could modify developmental organisation in a way that
facilitates or frustrates future evolution—hence the evolu-
tion of evolvability, i.e. evolved changes that affect the future
ability of a population or lineage to evolve (Wagner and
Altenberg 1996; Kirchner and Gerhart 1998; Chicurel 2001;
Partridge and Barton 2000; Hendrikse et al. 2007). Work on
this topic shows that the evolution of gene-regulatory inter-
actions or phenotypic correlations can enhance phenotypic
robustness (Wagner 2008, 2013), accelerate adaptation
under directional selection (Pavlicev et al. 2011), or evolve
to mimic the structure of the selective environment (Watson
et al. 2014; Riedl 1977), such as modularity (Lipson et al.
2002; Watson et al. 2014; Clune et al. 2013; Kashtan et al.
2007, 2009; Parter et al. 2008). But the general relationship
between the evolution of individual developmental interac-
tions and developmental organisations, and in particular the
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evolution of structures that facilitate evolvability, remains
poorly understood and conceptually problematic (Pigliucci
2007; Chicurel 2001; Partridge and Barton 2000; Snie-
gowski and Murphy 2006; Hendrikse et al. 2007). In par-
ticular, the idea that natural selection might change the
variability on which it depends introduces a self-referential
element that is particularly difficult to characterise with
conventional theory.
In evolutionary ecology (evo-eco) (Matthews et al. 2011;
Post and Palkovacs 2009; Schoener 2011; Mu¨ller 2007), the
details of the relationships in an ecological community have
a significant effect on the selective pressures acting on
component species (evo / eco). For example, the preva-
lence of a particular resource or competitor may be strongly
influenced by the existing ecological relationships in the
community, and may also dominate the selective pressures
on an evolving population within that community. The
structure of these ecological organisations is also itself
modified by the changing nature of ecological relationships,
due to the evolution and coevolution of the component
species in interaction with one another (e.g. changes in
individual characters that modify the overlap of resource
utilisation profiles, or by traits thatmodify the energy, time or
resources invested in exploiting one ecological relationship
rather than another) (evo ? eco)—see niche construction
and environment engineering (Odling-Smee et al. 2003;
Laland et al. 1999; Wright and Jones 2006; Post and Palko-
vacs 2009). The organisation of ecological relationships
(both trophic and non-trophic) can affect the stability, resi-
lience and homeostatic dynamics of ecological communities
and complex ecological functions (Jax 2010; Lenton 2004;
Holling 1973; Folke 2006; Gallopı´n 2006). Some argue that
the reciprocal causation involved in evo-ecological interac-
tions (i.e. evolution occurs in an ecological niche and the
ecological niche is itself a product of evolutionary processes;
Watson and Ebner 2014; Post and Palkovacs 2009) consti-
tutes a significant departure from conventional evolutionary
models (Laland et al. 2011; Mesoudi et al. 2013). But the
general relationship between the evolution of individual
ecological relationships and community organisation, and in
particular the evolution of ecological feedbacks that facili-
tate self-regulation or homeostasis, remains poorly under-
stood and conceptually problematic (Lawton 1999; Cropp
andGabric 2002; Okasha 2005; Lenton and vanOijen 2002).
In particular, the idea that natural selection might change the
selection pressures that act on itself introduces a self-refer-
ential element that is difficult to characterise with conven-
tional theory.
In the major evolutionary transitions (evo-ego) (Maynard
Smith and Szathma´ry 1995, Godfrey-Smith 2009; Michod
1999, 2007; Bourke 2011; Buss 1987; Okasha 2006; Bou-
chard and Huneman 2013), evolution has repeatedly rein-
vented itself—creating new evolutionary units at successive
scales of biological organisation, e.g. from self-replicating
molecules, to chromosomes, to simple cells, to multi-or-
ganelle eukaryote cells, to multicellular organisms, to
eusocial groups. These are not just changes in the charac-
teristics of an existing evolutionary entity, but the result of
changes to the reproductive relationships between evolu-
tionary entities such that ‘‘entities that were capable of
independent replication before the transition can replicate
only as part of a larger whole after the transition’’ (Maynard
Smith and Szathma´ry 1995). These changes, i.e. changes that
prevent independent replication, act to suppress fitness dif-
ferences between individuals at one level of organisation and
may provide opportunities for natural selection to create
heritable fitness differences at a higher-level of organisation
(Godfrey-Smith 2009; Okasha 2006; Michod and Roze
2001; Michod and Herron 2006; Ryan et al. 2015). This may
involve reproductive organisations that synchronise the
transmission of information across generations (e.g. vertical
transmission of symbionts, Margulis and Fester 1991;
compartmentalisation of replicators, Sigmund and Sza-
thma´ry 1998; Szathma´ry and Demeter 1987; or linkage of
replicating molecules into chromosomes, Maynard Smith
and Szathma´ry 1993) or restrict the channels of communi-
cation (e.g., bottle-necked life-cycle, germ-soma separation;
Godfrey-Smith 2009; Buss 1987). Such features change the
scale at which heritable variation in reproductive success is
manifest, thus resulting in the evolution of new levels of
Darwinian individuality (Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry
1995; Jablonka 1994; Clarke 2010; Okasha 2006; Godfrey-
Smith 2009; Wilson 1989; Bouchard and Huneman 2013)
(hence, ‘‘evo-ego’’). Note that the evolutionary unit can be
defined by the level (or levels) of organisation where varia-
tion in reproductive success is heritable (evo / ego)
(Clarke 2010; Godfrey-Smith 2009), and the level of
organisation that exhibits this can be modified by the prod-
ucts of the evolutionary process (evo ? ego). Work to
understand these evolutionary transitions in individuality is
motivating a new research programme within evolutionary
biology (Calcott and Sterelny 2011; Okasha 2006, Bouchard
and Huneman 2013) that encompasses concepts such as the
evolution of individuality, social group transformation, de-
Darwinisation (of individuals) and Darwinisation (of
groups) and export of fitness (from lower to higher units)
(Buss 1987; Bourke 2011; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Okasha
2006;Michod 1999). But at present the organising principles
involved in the evolution of reproductive dependencies, and
in particular the evolution of new levels of evolutionary
individuality, remain poorly understood and conceptually
challenging (Okasha 2006; Godfrey-Smith 2009). In par-
ticular, the idea that natural selection might redefine the
evolutionary unit, i.e. the reproductive heritability on which
it depends, introduces a self-referential element that is dif-
ficult to characterise with conventional theory.
Evol Biol (2016) 43:553–581 555
123
Each of these areas shares the common underlying
conceptual problem caused by bi-directional interactions or
reciprocal causation (Levins and Lewontin 1987; Post and
Palkovacs 2009; Laland et al. 2011, 2015), i.e. evolution
modifies organisations (often naturally described as net-
works) and these organisations modify the process of
evolution. The notion that evolutionary processes can
thereby change their own parameters is the root cause of
theoretical and conceptual roadblocks in each field (Wat-
son and Szathma´ry 2015).
In particular, although it is clear that evolution can
modify the parameters of variation, selection and inheri-
tance, and this might facilitate evolvability, it is not at all
clear that these organisations can be adaptations for
increased evolvability. In the absence of a higher-level
selective process that might favour evolutionary processes
that are successful in the long term, it seems equally likely
that such organisations might constrain or frustrate subse-
quent adaptation. For example, researchers in evo-devo
struggle to agree on whether the long term evolvability of a
population can systematically improve as a consequence of
natural selection acting on developmental organisations
(Pigliucci 2008; Sniegowski and Murphy 2006; Chicurel
2001; Partridge and Barton 2000; Pavlicev et al. 2011; Earl
and Deem 2004). Evo-eco recognises the pressing need to
predict how ecological resilience and ecosystem functions
change over time (Holling 1973; Gallopı´n 2006; Jax 2010).
Although evolution might change community organisation
in a way that increases the resilience or self-regulation of
the ecosystem (Cropp and Gabric 2002), when there is no
selection at the ecosystem level it seems equally likely to
become more susceptible to stresses and perturbations over
evolutionary time, possibly resulting in catastrophic col-
lapse in the long term (Holling and Gunderson 2002;
Montoya et al. 2006; Schoener 2011). Work in evo-ego
seeks to understand whether evolutionary transitions in
individuality result from systematic adaptive pressures
toward the creation of higher-level biological organisations
or whether they are merely a collection of independent
accidents (Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry 1995; Okasha
2006). It might be the case that the reproductive depen-
dencies evolved at one level of organisation create higher-
level organisations that are better-able to respond to
selective pressures relevant at the higher level of organi-
sation, but alternatively it might be the case that they
encapsulate maladaptive relationships that oppose an
effective response to higher-level selection.
Such problems motivate the growing recognition that
the Darwinian machine needs an overhaul: That self-ref-
erential evolutionary mechanisms (where the products of
evolution alter the processes of evolution) create serious
problems for existing theory (Laland et al. 2011), and that a
new and expanded theoretical framework is needed
(Pigliucci and Muller 2010; Laland et al. 2015) that inte-
grates ‘‘eco-evo-devo’’ processes (Blute 2008) (and we
would add ‘‘ego’’ to this list also).
The same underlying problem of reciprocal causation is
manifested differently in each domain. Whilst it is clear
that the products of the Darwinian machine can modify the
parameters of its own operation, it is not clear in what way
it changes itself and, in particular, whether it is possible
that the Darwinian machine changes systematically ‘for the
better’, i.e. in a way that facilitates rather than frustrates
subsequent adaptation. This problem arises in domain-
specific versions:
(a) Evo-devo—implications for modifying variability,
and the evolution of long-term evolvability:
Can development be organised to facilitate future
adaptation? That is, can evolution ‘predict’ or
‘anticipate’ what developmental organisations will
enable adaptive variation in new environments that it
has not yet been exposed to? Conversely, if all it
does is find organisations that are fit over the set of
past environments, then that seems to be conven-
tional evolution, not the evolution of evolvability.
(b) Evo-eco—implications for modifying the selective
context, and the evolution of ecosystem organisa-
tion:
Can an ecosystem be organised ‘for’ anything if it is
not an evolutionary unit? That is, how can natural
selection at the level of individuals within multiple
species result in ecological organisations that are
self-supporting at the system level (homeostasis), or
indeed, result in any kind of ‘ecosystem evolution’
that is more than the sum of the evolution of the
parts? (Levin 2011; Leigh and Vermeij 2002; Lenton
2004). It is clear that by evolving its ecological
relationships a species may modify the ecological
dynamics of the community and hence it’s ecolog-
ical context and hence the selection it experiences
over subsequent generations (i.e. niche construction,
Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 2013). But it is not clear
that it can do this in a way which is systematically
beneficial to itself, except in the case where such
benefits fall differentially on the individual bearing
the niche constructing trait (which implies it can be
treated as an extended phenotype of the individual).
For example, an individual character that reduces
competition for resources with another species offers
no differential advantage to the trait bearer if all
members of its species benefit from such reduced
competition (Wilson 1980). Thus we may expect that
the network of ecological relationships that evolve
may alter ecological dynamics and attractors, but not
necessarily in a manner that creates adaptive benefits
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to the species, let alone the community as a whole.
To clarify, we use the term ‘ecosystem evolution’
to refer to the ecosystem-level consequences of
natural selection acting on individuals within com-
ponent species (Levin 2011, 2014), e.g., evolution-
ary change in the inter-specific relationships of an
ecological community arising from individual-level
selection. We do not suggest that ecosystems or
ecological communities are units of selection (which
would require a population of multiple ecosystems
with heritable characteristics). Nonetheless, we ask
whether there exist conditions where individual
selection has emergent yet predictable consequences
for the organisation and efficiency of the system as a
whole (Levin 2011). Such questions are related to
questions regarding collective welfare in economic
systems under the assumption of individual utility-
maximising agents (Levin 2014), and the reciprocal
interaction of social behaviour with co-constructed
social structures, e.g. institutions, a.k.a. the agency-
structure debate, (Bator 1957, Ritzer and Goodman
2004).
(c) Evo-ego—implications for modifying heritability,
and the evolution of new evolutionary units:
Can evolution at one level of organisation favour the
creation of heritable evolutionary units that are
adaptive at a higher-level of organisation? That is,
can the evolution of reproductive organisations find
new heritable units that are suitable for responding to
selection at the higher level of organisation before
that level of organisation exists? (Trestman 2013).
Like the previous question, this is related to the
formation of social structures that change individual
incentives. But the outcome in this case is even more
radical—not merely the evolution of interaction
structures that incentivise cooperation in individuals,
but the evolution of reproductive dependencies that
create a new evolutionary unit, subsuming the Dar-
winian individuality of the original evolutionary
units. Moreover, not only do we ask whether indi-
vidual selection can create new evolutionary units,
but whether the new units it creates are effective at
facilitating adaptation at a higher level of organisa-
tion—or conversely, whether they frustrate further
adaptation.
In each case, the conventional answer seems to be—it
cannot. It is not possible for evolution by natural selection
to produce adaptations for an environment it has not yet
encountered, to produce organisation at the system level
without selection at the system level, or to create new units
that are adaptive for a level of selection that does not yet
exist.
Well-Understood Solutions in Learning Systems
We present the case that all of these behaviours that seem
impossible for evolutionary systems are possible, and that
necessary and sufficient conditions can be characterised.
We make this argument by recognising that analogous
behaviours are possible, and are well-understood, in
another domain—and because the underlying principles are
mathematically equivalent, specific results and insights
from one domain can be transferred to the other (Watson
and Szathma´ry 2015). This is a domain where the idea of a
system that changes itself over time is not controversial—
namely, learning systems.
A learning system is a system that improves its perfor-
mance at some task with experience (Mitchell 1997). A
simple kind of learning (often likened to natural selection)
is reinforcement learning. This utilises a reward function to
reinforce good behaviour or good outputs (or punish bad
outputs) when they occur. An analogy between this type of
learning and evolution by natural selection is common and
intuitive (Maynard Smith 1986; Frank 1996; Skinner 1953;
Bateson 1979) and mathematical isomorphisms exists
between formal models of selection and formal models of
learning (Harper 2009; Shalizi 2009; Frank 2009; Valiant
2013; Chastain et al. 2014).
It is common to think of learning systems as sophisti-
cated machines (or intelligent organisms) with goal-di-
rected intentions designed for the purpose of producing
smart behaviours—which would make their abilities irrel-
evant to understanding evolutionary processes. But, in fact,
all of the phenomena relevant to our evolutionary questions
can be produced by intention-less algorithms with simple
incremental improvement mechanisms. However, note that
in a learning system the object of this incremental
improvement process is different from a conventional
optimisation process. Whereas a simple processes of opti-
misation (or incremental improvement) is usually applied
to a solution or output directly, a learning process opti-
mises a model of good solutions or outputs or an indirect
representation of solutions. Evolutionarily, this is like the
difference between adapting the parameters of a phenotype
directly (e.g. the traits of a phenotype) vs adapting the
parameters of a developmental process that produces fit
phenotypes (this is a distinction which is lost when we
assume a one-to-one mapping between genotype and phe-
notype). The learning process optimises the fit of the model
to the observations (or minimises the discrepancy between
the model and the observations) by incrementally adjusting
the parameters of the model. The significance of this is that
the model can then be used to recognise or generate new
examples that have structural similarities with those that
have been rewarded in the past but are not identical to
them, and relatedly, examples that are far apart in ‘solution
Evol Biol (2016) 43:553–581 557
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space’ can be placed next to each in ‘model space’ (Watson
and Szathma´ry 2015).
In advanced learning methods a model can be compli-
cated and mechanisms for approximating the parameters of
the model from observations can be quite sophisticated.
But quite often the model can be simple; for example, a
correlation model is a representation of how features in
good solutions ‘go together’ or correlate. In practise, this
often means making connections of some sort between
different elements of a solution (causing their useage in
solutions to become correlated). Correlation learning can
be implemented via a very simple learning principle that
adjusts the connections of such an organisation incremen-
tally (Hebb 1949; Ackley et al. 1985). Mechanisms suffi-
cient to learn a single correlation (between a pair of
variables) by reinforcement can be trivial, i.e. just change a
connection a small amount and see if it improves the out-
put. This does not require sophisticated data structures,
mathematical or statistical analysis, or complex computa-
tional machinery. Given variation in the connections of a
network (that affects correlations between problem vari-
ables), it is simply an incremental improvement process
applied to those connections. This is a crucial step-up from
an incremental improvement process acting on the solution
variables directly, however. Rather than merely finding
good outputs, a learning process finds the structure
underlying good outputs. It is this which enables new
phenomenology compared to a simple optimisation pro-
cess; For example, the ability to generate new patterns or
behaviours that are different from the ones it was trained on
but exhibiting the same underlying structure.
The consequences of correlation learning in larger sys-
tems can be surprisingly powerful. Under the right condi-
tions, correlation learning is sufficient for the behaviours
that seemed impossible for evolutionary systems (a, b and c
above):
(a) Learning systems can perform well at novel tasks,
i.e. tasks they have not previously been trained on.
(b) Learning systems can exhibit non-trivial collective
behaviours without system-level feedback on
performance.
(c) Learning systems can find new representations of a
problem, that facilitate task learning at a higher level
of organisation, before those higher levels of organ-
isation exist.
These behaviours, described below, are uncontroversial
and well-understood in learning systems, but knowledge
about the conditions for and capabilities of such phenom-
ena has not been previously transferred into evolutionary
theory. Our long-term aim is to develop a unified predictive
theory for these evolutionary questions by exploiting the
existing concepts and extensive existing results from
learning systems. It is the aim of the current paper to
reinterpret the key open questions in these different bio-
logical domains from this unifying perspective, to describe
how learning theory connects with these biological ques-
tions, and to review and synthesise our work thus far. In
particular, we draw these works together to address their
inter-related roles in major evolutionary transitions.
Toward Unifying Principles: Connectionism
and Evolution
Developmental, ecological and reproductive organisations
are structures that determine which things ‘go together’ and
which things are independent. Specifically, the organisa-
tion of developmental interactions governs whether it is
possible for multiple coordinated changes to occur in a way
that preserves their functional dependencies without caus-
ing multiple unwanted side-effects on other aspects of the
phenotype. Ecological interactions specify how a change in
the density of one species modifies the selective pressures
acting on other species and thus govern which species are
mutually exclusive and which can coexist, for example.
Reproductive organisations govern whether fitness differ-
ences among the components within evolutionary units are
suppressed and whether fitness differences between dif-
ferent evolutionary units can be inherited. Understanding
the evolution of developmental, ecological and reproduc-
tive organisations thus requires that we understand how
evolution alters which things vary together, which things
are selected together and which things are inherited toge-
ther, respectively.
Connections and Correlations in Biological
Networks
It is common to describe developmental and ecological
interactions as networks (e.g. a gene-regulation network or
food web/community matrix, respectively). These net-
works describe who interacts with whom, in what way and
how much (i.e. how one gene-expression level affects
changes in the expression of other genes, or how the den-
sity of one species affects the population growth of another
species). Whilst it is not as common to describe repro-
ductive dependencies as networks, these relationships also
have the basic property of controlling how the inheritance
of one evolutionary unit is, or is not, independent of the
inheritance of another evolutionary unit. It is therefore
useful to characterise all three (developmental, ecological
and reproductive) organisations as networks. We can then
ask how the structure of that network (topological changes
including the strength and sign of connections, in some
558 Evol Biol (2016) 43:553–581
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cases) change over evolutionary time, and how those
structural changes then modify evolutionary processes.
When the structure of a network affects the dynamics
that occur on it, and the dynamics that occur on the net-
work affect changes to network structure, this is known as
an adaptive network (Gross and Sayama 2009), e.g. where
agents on a network can both choose behavioural strategies
that are suitable for the current organisation, and can also
choose to re-wire connections on the network to suit the
current behaviours (Jackson and Watts 2002; Pacheco et al.
2006; Traulsen et al. 2008; Van Segbroeck et al. 2010). We
argue that developmental, ecological and reproductive
organisations (like other complex adaptive systems, Farmer
1990) exhibit this two-way property.
More specifically, we investigate the hypothesis that the
evolution of developmental, ecological and reproductive
organisations are all subject to the same underlying
organisational principle, a simple principle of positive
feedback between the topology of an interaction network
and the behaviours that the network structure governs. That
is, a connection between two components or nodes in this
network causes them to exhibit correlated behaviour, and
when nodes have correlated behaviours this causes natural
selection to create or strengthen the connection between
them. In short, entities that co-occur together ‘wire’ toge-
ther (and entities that wire together co-occur together). For
example, (as expanded below) genes that are selected
together are wired together via the evolution of gene-reg-
ulatory interactions that cause them to co-vary (be co-ex-
pressed) in future, species that co-occur in high-density are
wired together by the evolution of ecological relationships
that cause them to be co-selected in future, and evolu-
tionary units that reproduce together are wired together by
changes to reproductive relationships that cause them to be
co-inherited in future. Empirical observations are consis-
tent with this simple positive feedback principle and in this
paper we present theoretical support for each of these
cases:
(a) Evo-devo: The more often that two genes are selected
together (at the same time/in the same environment)
the more selective advantage there is to strengthening
developmental interactions between them. This
organisational change causes their expression in the
phenotype to be correlated in future (e.g. via an
increase in the gene-regulatory connection between
them; Wagner et al. 2007; Pavlicev et al. 2011;
Watson et al. 2014; Kashtan et al. 2009). See also, for
example, the principle of ‘coevolution of coexpressed
traits’ and conversely ‘the rule of independent selec-
tion’ (West-Eberhard 2003).
(b) Evo-eco: The more often that two species popula-
tions grow to high-density together (at the same
time/in the same environment) the more selective
advantage there is for individual traits that
strengthen ecological interactions between them.
These interactions change in a way that causes their
population growth to be more correlated in future,
e.g. via reductions to competitive interactions
between them (Lewis 2009; Power et al. 2015).
For example, this type of feedback is part of the
backstory involved in ‘invasional meltdown’ (Gal-
lardo and Aldridge 2015; Simberloff and Von-Holle
1999) where species that have been in prolonged
contact with one another in one environment facil-
itate one-another’s invasion into another environ-
ment because they ‘‘have had a long evolutionary
time to develop a cosy relationship with each other’’
(Gallardo and Aldridge 2015). This might involve
character displacement that reduces niche overlap
when species are driven into contact (Brown and
Wilson 1956; Dayan and Simberloff 2005).
(c) Evo-ego: The more often two evolutionary units
reproduce together (at the same time/in the same
environment) the more selective advantage there is
to individual traits that strengthen reproductive
dependencies between them. Such reproductive
interactions (controlled by individual selection in
either participant) cause their reproduction to be
more strongly correlated or centralised in future (e.g.
via evolution of co-dispersal behaviours or vertical
inheritance) (Watson et al. 2009b, 2011b, submit-
ted). For example, the ‘free-living’ ancestors of
eukaryote organelles initially evolved close symbi-
otic relationships with the host cell (they were still
separate evolutionary units at this stage, but repro-
ducing together), and latterly became reproductively
centralised and synchronised (Margulis 1981, 1993).
The consequence of this positive feedback is captured
by a principle of correlation becomes causation. That is,
variables (phenotypic characters, species populations,
evolutionary units) whose behaviours originally co-varied
because of a correlated external stimulus (or by accident, or
because of selection acting at a lower level) come to have
behaviours that co-vary because of their internal interaction
structures (i.e., developmental interactions, ecological
partnerships or reproductive dependencies). In the devel-
opmental domain, Riedl describes this observation as the
evolution of developmental architectures that ‘‘mimic’’ the
functional constraints on phenotypes (Riedl 1977; Wagner
and Laubichler 2004). See also the conversion of alternate
‘‘ecosystem states’’ (configurations that are forced by
changes to environmental conditions) into alternate
‘‘community states’’ (configurations that are intrinsic
attractors of the ecological population dynamics) (Beisner
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et al. 2003; Power et al. 2015), and the concept of sym-
biogenesis in the evo-ego domain (Margulis 1981, 1993;
Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry 1995).
Although this positive feedback between topology and
behaviour (organisation and evolution) is simple when
considering individual connections between a pair of
entities, the consequences of this principle for the dynamics
of larger systems is much more interesting but not imme-
diately obvious. However, connectionist models of learning
and memory have characterised the capabilities and limi-
tations of learning models based on this type of feedback in
great detail. Such connectionist models can thus be used to
recognise common principles across multiple domains
(Farmer 1990). We show how this can be used to advance
our understanding of this feedback principle in evolution-
ary systems—hence, evolutionary connectionism. More-
over, we argue that the different consequences of this
feedback in evolutionary systems (affecting developmen-
tal, ecological and reproductive networks) have specific
analogues in different applications of correlation learning
(namely, reinforcement correlation learning, unsupervised
correlation learning and deep correlation learning, respec-
tively) that help us to understand how natural selection
changes the processes of variation, selection and inheri-
tance, respectively, in evolutionary systems.
Connectionism in Cognitive Science
Connectionism is an approach to cognitive modelling that
attempts to explain the cleverness of cognitive processes not
by ascribing sophistication to the individual component parts
(such as individual neurons) but to the organisation of the
connections between them (Garson 2015). Artificial neural
network models provide a mechanistic basis to this idea
(Hinton et al. 1986; Rumelhart et al. 1986). The field of
artificial neural networks has been extraordinarily successful
in providing a substantially different way of conceptualising
the possible machineries of memory, learning, perception
and problem solving as decentralised and distributed pro-
cesses (Clark 1995; Hinton et al. 1986). They have also been,
and continue to be, extremely successful in providing prac-
tical machine learning methods for classification, pattern
recognition, clustering, data compression and optimisation
in innumerable application domains (Rumelhart et al. 1986;
Hinton and Sejnowski 1999; O’Reilly and Munakata 2000;
Hinton 2007), thus demonstrating that such distributed and
decentralised mechanisms can exhibit computationally
powerful collective behaviours.
The kind of neural networks that are relevant here are
very simple and very well-studied. Such a network is
characterised by a number of nodes, in a network of con-
nections, where the activation of each node is a non-linear
weighted sum of the input activations it receives from other
nodes (note that in gene networks, the expression potential
of a gene is generally modelled as a non-linear weighted
sum of expression potentials of other genes, and in eco-
logical networks the rate of growth of a species is often
modelled as a non-linear weighted sum of other species
densities; Watson et al. 2014; Power et al. 2015). The
Hopfield network, in particular, has been used as a model
for dynamical systems and emergent collective behaviours
in many different domains (Hopfield 1982). This is a net-
work where every node is potentially connected to every
other node bi-directionally. Neural network models are
useful to us in this context because they show that -
(1) Many interesting and non-trivial collective beha-
viours can arise from a network of individually
simple components if the connections between them
are appropriately organised.
(2) Organisations sufficient to produce such behaviours
can arise from very simple learning mechanisms that
modify connections incrementally.
These learning mechanisms gradually modify the
organisation of the system by incrementally adjusting the
strength of connections in the network. Modifying con-
nection strengths in this manner has the effect of altering
the correlation between the activation of one node and the
activation of another. A positive connection produces
positive correlation in the activation of the nodes it con-
nects; conversely a negative connection means that when
one is activated the activation of the other is suppressed.
Adjusting connections in this manner is therefore a type of
correlation learning (Hinton and Sejnowski 1999). This
type of learning is just a way of implementing the very
general idea of associative learning which has influenced
cognitive modelling for centuries (Kallich 1945), i.e.
learning which objects or ideas go together, or learning
which stimuli go together with which outcomes, or beha-
viours with rewards.
In practice, neural network learning methods often cal-
culate the appropriate change for each connection based on
the observed error, i.e. the difference between desired and
actual outputs—see, e.g. the Delta Rule and Back-Pro-
pogation algorithms (Rumelhart et al. 1986). Such super-
vised learning assumes that information is provided about
what the correct output is during training. But this is not
necessary. Correlations can also be learned via reinforce-
ment learning without a priori knowledge about what the
correct output is. This can be as simple as modifying
connections at random and retaining modifications that
improve the output. Whether it is by trial and error (rein-
forcement learning) or by such supervised learning calcu-
lations, the direction of change that provides improvements
is the same (at least in the limit where changes affect one
connection at a time). Accordingly, an equivalence with the
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action of natural selection can be verified (Valiant 2013;
Watson et al. 2010a). In addition to improving the output of
the system immediately, the consequence of such learned
connections on the future behaviour of the system is to
make those combinations of outputs that were rewarded in
the past more likely to occur again in future (i.e. positive
feedback on correlations). The subsequent behaviour of the
system is thus partly determined by the current inputs at
that point time, but partly determined by the past experi-
ence of the system recorded, in a distributed manner, in the
network of relatively slow-changing interactions.
In contrast to supervised and reinforcement learning,
some learning mechanisms are unsupervised which means
they do not use a task-based performance metric at all
(Hinton and Sejnowski 1999). One very well-known
example of this employs a type of Hebbian learning (Hebb
1949), often paraphrased as ‘neurons that fire together wire
together’—meaning that the synaptic connection between
two neurons is strengthened when the neurons are both
stimulated at the same time (e.g. by the same input or
stimulus). Under Hebbian learning, the direction of change
in the connection is determined by the current output of the
system (e.g. whether the two neurons are currently firing)
not by a task-specific performance metric. This type of
unsupervised learning mechanism is equivalent to rein-
forcement learning that favours amplification (increase in
magnitude) of the current outputs regardless of what they
are (i.e. their signs). Because this amplification is enacted
through changes to connections rather than independent
variables, it has the consequence of reinforcing combina-
tions of values in the current output. This causes those
combinations of outputs to become more stable and resi-
lient to perturbation. That is, if one or a small number of
the system variables are changed, the weighted connections
from other variables that have not changed will force it to
change back (or will reduce the external input necessary to
change it back). For a given distribution of initial condi-
tions, this means that that particular combination of values
is more likely to re-occur (in dynamical systems terms, the
initial conditions that lead to a particular attractor state is
the ‘basin of attraction’ for that pattern, and the effect of
this type of learning is to increase the size of this attractor
basin, i.e. to increase the number of initial conditions that
lead to that attractor). Thus, whereas reinforcement learn-
ing strengthens correlations that are good (making changes
that improve rewards and make good combinations of
outputs more likely to occur in future), unsupervised
learning merely strengthens correlations that are frequent
(making changes that amplify or stabilise the current output
and make those combinations of outputs more likely to
occur again in future).
Hebbian learning is a fully distributed learning mecha-
nism (i.e. the change in a connection is a function only of the
activation in the two nodes it connects) and the change is not
a function of system-level performance or any other system-
level quantity. This type of learning nonetheless has pre-
dictable consequences for the behaviour of the network as a
whole. In particular, it effectively ‘internalises’ correlations
that are frequent in the input, i.e. two neurons that originally
fired together because they frequently responded to the same
external inputs, subsequently fire together because of the
synaptic connection that has been strengthened between
them. This causes the internal structure of the learning sys-
tem tomimic or ‘mirror’ the structure of patterns observed in
the input/external environment (i.e. learning which features
of the input co-vary and which are independent), and the
activation dynamics of the system to recreate patterns of
activation that are ‘familiar’ given its past experience. This is
called an associative memory (Hopfield 1982) which has
many interesting properties: the ability to store and recall
multiple activity patterns, to recall patterns of activation
from partial stimuli, to cluster data points into intrinsically
similar groups, to classify novel patterns into such cate-
gories, to repair corrupted patterns (toward the nearest
training pattern), to generate generalised patterns based on
structural similarity, perform dimensional reduction/data
compression, and to produce idealised exemplars of class
from noisy or corrupted training samples (Hopfield 1982;
Hinton and Sejnowski 1999). All of these functions are
consequences of the simple incremental changes to con-
nections that reinforce frequent correlations.
Correlation learning is thus based on the same positive
feedback between topology and behaviour that we
observed in the other biological networks. That is, neurons
whose behaviours originally co-varied because they were
rewarded at the same time, or co-varied because of a
common external stimulus, come to have behaviours that
co-vary because of their internal interaction structures (i.e.,
synaptic connections). In the context of connectionist
models of learning, it is clear that there are many inter-
esting and well-understood consequences for the subse-
quent behaviour of the system that follow directly from this
basic principle. Crucially, these consequences follow
inevitably from this basic principle and are not special to
neural networks; any network that exhibits this same
principle at the level of individual connections, will also
exhibit the same system-level behaviours. In other words,
the learning algorithm that is implemented in artificial
neural networks is substrate independent and will thus be
instantiated in any network that has the same kind of
positive feedback.
‘‘Evolutionary Connectionism’’
We introduce the term ‘‘evolutionary connectionism’’ to
recognise that, by processes that are functionally equivalent
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to connectionist models of memory and learning, natural
selection acting on the relationships within and between
evolutionary entities can result in organisations that pro-
duce complex system-level behaviours in evolutionary
systems and improve the adaptive capabilities of natural
selection over time. The basis of evolutionary connec-
tionism is that the simple principle of positive feedback on
the organisation of a system, well-understood in the context
of neural network models, is also common to the evolution
of developmental, ecological and reproductive organisa-
tions. This has the potential to unlock a well-established
field of research, with specific conceptual and mechanistic
models and results, which can be utilised to understand the
evolution of biological organisations under natural selec-
tion (Farmer 1990). In particular, this framework helps us
to make sense of the bi-directional feedback between
evolutionary processes and structural organisations, and
also to understand how the consequent changes to the
organisation of the parts modifies the collective behaviour
and optimisation of the whole. Hence it provides a theo-
retical framework where we can begin to understand how it
is possible for the Darwinian machine to change its own
operational mechanisms over time, and how this can
improve its ability to produce adaptive change by inter-
nalising and exploiting past experience.
It is not too difficult to see that, given heritable variation
in interactions and selection, evolving systems will exhibit
changes to connections analogous to correlation learning
by reinforcement (Watson et al. 2010a; Valiant 2013;
Watson and Szathma´ry 2015). The evolutionary conditions
that correspond to reinforcement learning are simply those
that reward changes to interactions that improve fitness
(e.g. changes to a gene network that increase fitness by
changing the gene expression pattern/phenotype that the
network produces, Watson et al. 2014).
If the current output of the network is already the
desired output of the network, or even the locally optimal
output, then the distinction between reinforcement learning
and unsupervised learning is moot (i.e. reinforcing the
current behaviour and reinforcing the good behaviour is the
same). Unsupervised correlation learning is a suit-
able model for evolutionary change in such cases. For
example: (1) When selection favours increased robustness.
Although there may be other quite different phenotypes
that are higher in fitness to the current phenotype, local
selective gradients may nonetheless favour changes to
network structure that amplify the current phenotype or
reduce phenotypic variability. If this is enacted by chang-
ing correlations (i.e. reinforcing the co-occurrence of fea-
tures that already co-occur) and not merely by removing
variability from individual features, this is equivalent to
unsupervised correlation learning. Selection for robustness
is another way of saying that the current output is the
desired output, but in a locally optimal sense (i.e. all small
variations are inferior). (2) The effect of individual-level
selection acting on interactions between different evolu-
tionary units within collectives (e.g. individuals within an
ecological community). Because individuals adopt beha-
viours that (locally) maximise individual fitness, individual
selection favours variations that enable them to retain their
current behaviour (or do more of the same behaviour). This
is not, in general, good for the fitness of the collective (the
sum of individual fitnesses); whenever individual beha-
viours are subject to a social dilemma, the behaviours
adopted under individual selection do not maximise col-
lective fitness. Nonetheless, in reinforcing the current
behaviour of each individual the configuration of the col-
lective is made more stable or robust. If these changes are
enacted by altering the coordination of social behaviours
with other individuals, and not merely by altering indi-
vidual behaviours, this is equivalent to unsupervised cor-
relation learning at the system level; i.e. reinforcement
learning at the individual level can produce unsupervised
learning at the system level (Power et al. 2015; Watson
et al. 2010a). This is yet another way of saying that the
current behaviour is the desired behaviour—but here the
point is that the current behaviour of the system is the
locally desirable behaviour for individuals even if it is not
‘the desirable behaviour’ for collective fitness. In sum, both
reinforcement correlation learning and unsupervised cor-
relation learning mechanisms can occur in evolutionary
systems; unsupervised correlation learning results from
selection for robustness at the system level or from selec-
tion acting at a lower level (maximising the utility of the
components rather than the collective).
It is not a coincidence that learning systems and
evolving systems exhibit the same organisation principles.
The reason that connections are changed by reinforcement
(or unsupervised) learning in the direction that they are is
because that is the direction that improves the output of the
system (or amplifies the current output). And the reason
that natural selection evolves changes to connections in the
same direction is because that is likewise the direction that
improves the output of the system (or retains its current
fitness levels). It is simply the result of selection for good
or non-worse patterns of correlation. By adopting structural
configurations that mimic the selective environments they
have experienced, or by canalising their current response to
it, they can increase fitness or prevent it from being
decreased. The consequence of these selected changes is
that evolving systems internalise information about the
environment (e.g. what combinations of phenotypic fea-
tures are fit, or what combinations of species can coexist
given the prevailing abiotic conditions).
In fact, this kind of change is so basic and natural that it
occurs spontaneously in any dynamical system built from a
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network of malleable interactions—in this sense, neural
and evolutionary organisations are both examples of the
same underlying principles. For example, even a purely
physical system of particles and springs, where the springs,
as well as being elastic, are also slightly plastic (e.g.
weaken with stress), will exhibit this type of positive
feedback (we assume that the spring constants change
slowly compared to changes in the particle states that they
control). This does not require natural selection; rather,
spring-changes merely minimise energy (i.e. adopt a con-
figuration that causes them to do less work, a.k.a. wearing
out or deforming under forcing) given the structure of the
perturbations exerted on them by the environment. We
argue that organisations evolving under natural selection
necessarily follow the same basic principle. Each adopts an
organisation that reflects the structure of the environment
that they are exposed to because organisations that do not
will be changed by the action of the environment (Ashby
1956, 1960; Godfrey-Smith 1994; Gell-Mann 1994).
Whereas the consequences of this type of feedback in
developmental, ecological and reproductive organisations
is very poorly understood, the consequence of this type of
feedback in neural networks has been thoroughly charac-
terised by decades of research. This enables us to under-
stand how the action of this feedback on individual
connections modifies the organisation and dynamical
behaviour of the system as a whole—in particular, its
problem solving or optimisation capabilities.
Learning How to Adapt
A learning system improves its performance at some
behaviour (e.g. classification, clustering, foraging) by
incrementally optimising the parameters of that behaviour.
Although the behaviour being improved is not usually an
optimisation process, it can be. Our recent work shows how
a learning system can learn how to optimise more effi-
ciently and effectively over time by beneficially biasing the
parameters of the optimisation process (Watson et al.
2010b, 2011a, b). For an optimisation process based on
trial and error (formally, ‘generate’ and ‘test’, Watson et al.
2011b), there are logically two different ways in which the
trajectory of the search process through solution space can
be biased: (a) by changing the test function or selection
function, i.e. the way new solutions are evaluated or their
apparent value, or (b) by changing the way new solutions
are generated. Intuitively, changing the apparent value of a
solution (e.g. by artificially increasing the value of certain
combinations of variables that are ‘familiar’ given past
experience), may enable an optimisation process to escape
a local peak in a reward function by raising the value of
some points and/or lowering others. Whereas, changing the
way solutions are generated (e.g. by re-using a particular
combination of variables, i.e. a module, and substituting it
for another) may enable an optimisation process to escape a
local peak in a reward function by creating directed
‘jumps’ in solution space (Watson et al. 2011b).
Learning How to Adapt by Changing the Selection
Function
This approach can be demonstrated by combining two
previously unrelated behaviours, each independently well-
understood in the Hopfield network but not previously
brought together (Watson et al. 2009a, 2010b):
(i) The connections of a (non-learning) network can be
defined to represent the constraints of a constraint
optimisation problem, and running the network
with this interaction structure causes it to find
activation patterns that are locally optimal solutions
to that problem (Hopfield and Tank 1985, 1986).
(ii) A learning network shows an ability to form a
generalised memory of past experience by inter-
nalising correlation structures observed/experi-
enced in that environment (Hopfield 1982,
Fontanari 1990).
Combining these two behaviours in the same network
(but on different timescales) defines an interesting new
kind of dynamical system. This combines fast state
dynamics (with occasional perturbations) and relatively
slow changes to connections. Initially the behaviour of the
activation dynamics merely finds locally optimal solutions
to the problem, as in (i). But at the same time the network
is learning. It is not learning a predefined set of patterns as
in (ii), however. Rather it is mimicking the patterns of
activation that are found at locally optimal configurations.
We call this a self-modelling system (Watson et al. 2010b)
because the changes to its connections effectively form an
associative memory of its own behaviour. This bidirec-
tional feedback between the behaviour of the system and
the organisation of the system means that as the organi-
sation of the network begins to change, it changes how the
system behaves, and hence changes the solutions that it
finds. Specifically, we show that this causes the system to
find better solutions more reliably over time, and can
enable it to find high-quality solutions that would otherwise
be, not just found less frequently, but highly unlikely to be
found at all (Watson et al. 2010b). In some cases, unsu-
pervised correlation learning (or equivalently, reinforce-
ment learning applied at the component level), is sufficient
to attain these behaviours.
The explanation of why a self-modelling system finds
better solutions over time has three parts (Watson et al.
2009b, 2010b, 2011a). First, in systems involvingmany low-
order (e.g. pairwise) constraints, the size of dynamical
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attractors (if there are multiple attractors) is positively cor-
relatedwith their depth (i.e. low energy attractor states can be
reached from more initial conditions than higher energy
attractor states). For this not to be the case the slope of the
energy landscape would have to be arbitrarily steep, and this
cannot be the case when the energy function is built from the
sum ofmany low-order, e.g. pairwise, interaction terms each
of limitedmagnitude. Second, the positive feedback between
the activation dynamics on the network and changes to the
topology of the network means that configurations that are
most frequently observed are most frequently reinforced.
Given the first point, this increases the likelihood that the
system finds good configurations that it has found in the past,
and decreases the likelihood that it will find inferior solutions
over time. Third, andmore interestingly, correlation learning
forms a generalised associative memory of a set of patterns
(Fontanari 1990) and not just a ‘rote’ memory. This means
that if there is an underlying structural regularity common to
easy-to-find locally optimal solutions that can be represented
in a correlation model, then the structure that the network
learns will reflect the correlation structure of those patterns
and not the patterns per se. The network is therefore able to
favour novel patterns with this underlying regularity and is
not merely limited to favouring the specific patterns it has
already discovered. Thus, by mimicking the correlation
patterns observed in the problem the system can generalise
over a distribution of easy-to-find locally optimal solutions
to enlarge the basin of attraction for exceptionally high-
quality solutions even before such solutions have been vis-
ited for the first time (Watson et al. 2010b). In terms of
adaptive systems more generally, these conditions create a
link between simple habituation behaviours (that canalise
the current system state or make it more robust) and adap-
tation that generates and exploits novel configurations that
may be superior to any previously experienced past state. In
evolutionary terms, this is the link between robustness and
evolvability.
Computationally, this is a simple form of model-build-
ing optimisation (Pelikan et al. 1999; Hauschild and Peli-
kan 2011). These are techniques that learn a model of the
problem structure and then use this structure to find better
solutions to the problem. But in this case, this occurs
without using specialised machine learning mechanisms. It
uses only very simple positive feedback principles, based
on incremental changes to connections that are generic
across a broad range of adaptive networks (Watson et al.
2010b, 2011a; Mills 2010).
Learning How to Adapt by Changing the Generate
Function (‘Deep Optimisation’)
Although the optimisation capabilities of self-modelling
dynamical systems are demonstrably superior to those of
non-learning networks, the capabilities of non-hierarchical
systems are limited. Specifically, if a problem has struc-
tural regularities that cannot be represented in pairwise
correlations, incremental modification of pairwise con-
nections will not be able to capture or exploit this regu-
larity. However, deep or multi-layered networks (Hinton
2007; Rumelhart et al. 1986) can represent higher-order
structural regularities that cannot be represented in single-
level networks.
The problem-solving principles underlying deep learn-
ing are related to problem decomposition and ‘chunking’
(Mills 2010; Mills et al. 2014; Watson 2006), i.e. breaking
a complex or high-dimensional problem down into more
manageable sub-problems and then assembling together
the solutions to these sub-problems in different ways to
solve larger problems, and so on. The tricky thing is how to
do this ‘bottom-up’ i.e. without a teacher, providing
knowledge of how to decompose the problem, to guide the
learner through the necessary steps. In neural networks, this
type of hierarchical learning is recently referred to as ‘deep
learning’ (Hinton 2007; Hinton et al. 2006; Hinton and
Salakhutdinov 2006), but the ambition to build deep
learning models has been around a long time, e.g. by
building networks with many layers; each layer taking
inputs from the previous layer, transforming it into a new
representation, and passing that on the next layer
(Rumelhart et al. 1986). In these cases the overall learning
task is often supervised (i.e. a performance metric on the
output layer is used). However, the trouble with conven-
tional approaches is that assessing the error on the output of
the network massively underdetermines the changes that
are required on intermediate layers (a.k.a. hidden layers) of
the network (Rumelhart et al. 1986; Hinton 2007). That is,
there are many different possible intermediate representa-
tions that can give the same outputs for a given input (but
only some of these will generalise well). Moreover, it is not
clear how to devise an appropriate supervised learning
function that operates directly on the intermediate layers
(that is, an intermediate representation that is ‘correct’ for
one output layer may be useless for a different output
layer). An exciting new development in neural network
research, Deep belief networks (Hinton et al. 2006; Hinton
2007), has revived interest in deep learning by providing a
new approach to this problem. This technique uses unsu-
pervised learning to build intermediate levels of represen-
tation one at a time, and ‘freezes’ what has been learned in
each layer of connections before the next level of organi-
sation is added on top. This exploits the ability of unsu-
pervised learning to find representations that mimic the
intrinsic structure of the problem (without feedback on
performance) to reduce the dimensionality of the problem
before higher-level layers are constructed. This low-di-
mensional representation can make task-learning at the
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next level easier, and thus provides good generalisation for
supervised learning at a higher-level of the network even
though that level of the network didn’t exist at the time the
lower layer was learned. In this manner, a combination of
unsupervised and supervised learning is far more compu-
tationally efficient than either alone.
Using these deep learning ideas to improve an optimi-
sation process leads to what we might term deep optimi-
sation (closely related to multi-scale search, Mills et al.
2014). The idea here is a process that first uses a simple
hill-climbing optimisation process to find local optima,
then learns and exploits low-order regularities over a dis-
tribution of these optima to find better optima, then learns
higher-level regularities from a distribution of these optima
to improve optimisation further, and so on. We have
demonstrated that this type of learning can efficiently solve
optimisation problems that are provably difficult for single-
scale search (Mills 2010; Mills et al. 2014). This technique
exploits the multi-scale aspect of an individual-based evo-
ego model (Watson et al. 2009b, Watson et al., submitted)
and implements it in a machine learning method (without
the need for an individual-based simulation model). Rela-
ted but more sophisticated principles are involved in
grammar-based optimisation methods. Here a schema
grammar, representing the hierarchical correlations
observed in a distribution of above-average solutions, is
learned and exploited to re-scale the search process at a
higher level of organisation (Cox 2012; Cox and Watson
2014).
A deep optimisation approach can also be implemented
in a fully distributed neural network model using only local
learning mechanisms. This is an extension of the self-
modelling dynamical system above and learns connections
in exactly the same way, i.e. by reinforcing connections
that are frequently observed at local optima. The difference
is in what the connections mean—their causal role in the
dynamics of the system behaviour. In the simpler self-
modelling system, changes to connections have the effect
of altering the fitness function of the optimiser, or equiv-
alently, the energy function of the dynamical system—
making familiar configurations lower energy (i.e. more
likely to be retained). In the ‘deep’ version of the self-
modelling dynamical system (a.k.a. ‘‘rHN-g’’, Watson
et al. 2011b), changes to connections do not alter the
energy function but they alter the way movements in
configuration space are sampled. Specifically, the learned
links are used to create clusters of state variables that vary
in a coordinated fashion. These higher-level units, or
modules, change subsets of variables simultaneously, and
these multiple state changes will either all be kept or all
rejected, as a unit, depending on the change in energy/fit-
ness that they confer. This enables directed jumps in con-
figuration space—changes to many variables that may be
beneficial in combination even if each individual variable-
change involved is individually deleterious. Higher-level,
clusters of clusters can be created recursively or hierar-
chically in the same way. This has been shown to solve
modular constraint problems that cannot be solved by self-
modelling networks that do not have the ability to do this
recursive encapsulation (Mills 2010; Mills et al. 2014;
Watson et al. 2011b). These optimisation techniques pro-
vide a solution to the problem of inventing a representation
that makes a problem easy to solve by recoding the original
high-dimensional problem into a lower-dimensional rep-
resentation of the problem space (Watson et al. 2011b).
The positive feedback principle is still apparent in the way
connections are learned and used; i.e. variables whose
values are frequently correlated become ‘wired’ together in
such a way that, after they have been connected, they
cannot vary independently—they are transformed into a
new emergent or higher-level state variable.
Importantly, the reason that a new connection is made is
not, and cannot be, because this connection will, at some
point in the future, provide jumps in configuration space
that are adaptive; a benefit that has not yet happened cannot
be the reason the connection was made. The connections
that are made simply canalise the co-occurrence of vari-
ables that already co-occur (and are therefore close to
neutral at the time they are made). Over a distribution of
local optima, the connections that are most robust (most
often neutral) are retained by the learning algorithm and
those that are less robust (occasionally deleterious) are
removed. This deep optimisation technique thus exploits
the unsupervised correlation learning principle of deep
learning: connections that canalise existing correlations
reduce the dimensionality of the problem space in a way
that is effective in enabling adaptive jumps in configuration
space (or movements in a higher-level representation of the
problem), even though those higher-level jumps have not
yet occurred.
Together these works show that learning can improve
optimisation. This can be achieved by using learning to
bias selection, i.e. altering the effective energy function (or
the fitness function) that controls the dynamics of the
system. Or it can be achieved by using learning to bias the
movements that are sampled in configuration space, e.g. by
exploiting modularity or, in particular, by collapsing sub-
sets of variables into higher-level emergent variables
(Watson et al. 2011b). The deep optimisation provided by
changing the generate function has optimisation capabili-
ties that cannot be exhibited by changing the selection
function. Next we argue that these different types of con-
nectionist learning are implemented in the evolution of
different types of biological organisations, and that they
have analogous consequences for the adaptive capabilities
of evolution by natural selection.
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Evolutionary Connectionism and the Level
of Evolutionary Unit
We argue that specific but different types of correlation
learning are directly relevant to understanding the evolution
of developmental and ecological organisations, and to
understanding how they work together with the evolution of
reproductive organisations in the evolutionary transitions.
The evolution of developmental and ecological organi-
sations are very different from each other because of the
level of organisation that constitutes the evolutionary unit
in these two cases. Developmental networks, controlling
the combinations of features that co-occur in phenotypes,
are selected as a single evolutionary unit; selection applies
at the level of the whole network and changes in the
organisation of the network can be selected because of the
differences they confer on the phenotypes that are pro-
duced. This is the analogue of reinforcement correlation
learning. In contrast, ecological networks are not evolu-
tionary units, and when we talk about the evolution of the
ecological network we just mean the changes, caused by
evolution, that occur as a consequence of natural selection
acting on the composition of each species within the eco-
logical community individually not as a composite unit (in
short, no group selection here). Because selection occurs at
the individual level and not the system level, this is the
analogue of unsupervised correlation learning—selection
does not act to increase collective fitness (in general) but in
acting to increase individual fitness (by changing commu-
nity interaction terms) it can have the (side-)effect of sta-
bilising the current ecological composition or increasing
ecological robustness. Interestingly, the observation that
selection for robustness at the system level also follows
unsupervised learning principles seems to imply an
underlying equivalence between selection for robustness at
the system level and selection that acts on components
below the system level—e.g. selection that favours mod-
ularity or features that are independently beneficial is
closely related to selection that favours robustness at the
system level. But importantly, system robustness produced
by changes to interactions does not simply remove vari-
ability, but shapes or directs variability at the system
level—in the same way that unsupervised correlation
learning mimics correlations in the input.
Our work described below suggests that the evolution of
developmental and ecological interactions are both analo-
gous to self-modelling systems that alter the selection
function—but whereas changing ecological interactions
explicitly alters selection on evolutionary units by altering
the relationships they have with other units (ecological
relationships between species in the community), changing
developmental interactions alters ‘selection’ on compo-
nents that are internal to the evolutionary unit (e.g. on
gene-expression potentials within the organism). The latter
has the effect of biasing the phenotypic variation that is
produced at the system level, i.e. by changing the co-oc-
currence of traits in the phenotype.
The evolution of reproductive relationships is not cap-
tured by any one level of evolutionary unit—neither the
system as awhole nor the individual components. Rather, the
evolution of reproductive relationships is precisely con-
cerned with changes in the evolutionary unit—changes that
convert multiple evolutionary units at one level of organi-
sation into a new evolutionary unit at a higher level of
organisation. These changes must be driven by the lower
level evolutionary unit—the higher level unit cannot be
driving the evolutionary process before it exists (Ryan et al.
2015). We argue that this is analogous to the incremental
addition of new layers of organisation in deep learning
(combining unsupervised and supervised correlation learn-
ingmechanisms applied at successive scales of organisation)
or to the rescaling of the optimisation process as per the
distributed deep optimisation models. This biases the com-
binations of particles that are created in a more radical
(multi-scale) manner than the evolution of developmental
interactions (Watson et al. 2011b). Specifically, whereas
developmental organisations bias phenotypic variability (by
recreating specific phenotypic patterns through the organi-
sation of internal selection or context-sensitive differential
growth between components) (Laland et al. 2014), repro-
ductive organisations can bias genetic variability (by
enabling the combination of genetic differences in a col-
lective to be inherited to descendent collectives as a unit and
supressing internal differential selection between them).
Accordingly, although evo-devo, evo-eco and evo-ego
domains each have their own special characteristics, there
are methodological reasons to study them as a set:
(1) They have common underlying principles that can be
captured by adaptive networks. In particular, a
positive feedback between topology and behaviour
(i.e. correlated behaviours result in the evolution of
stronger network interactions which in turn produce
more strongly correlated behaviours, and so on).
(2) Learning theory offers detailed knowledge about the
consequences of this type of positive feedback in
networks, namely correlation learning—offering
unifying principles for studying the evolution of
these three classes of biological networks.
(3) Learning theory also offers well-studied variants of
correlation learning (reinforcement correlation learn-
ing, unsupervised correlation learning and deep
correlation learning) that apply to developmental,
ecological and reproductive organisations, respec-
tively—offering principles that help us understand
the algorithmic distinctions between the three cases.
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Studying them as a set is also motivated by their com-
plementary roles in the major evolutionary transitions:
(4) Taken together, developmental, ecological and
reproductive organisations cover the evolution of
the necessary and sufficient components of the
Darwinian machine, namely, variation, selection
and inheritance, respectively.
(5) The three organisations are complementary in the
level of evolutionary unit they address: evolution of
a network as a single evolutionary unit (evo-devo),
evolution of multiple evolutionary units within a
network (evo-eco), and evolution that changes the
evolutionary units (subsets of nodes become single
nodes) (evo-ego).
(6) Together they control how information about the
selective environment (e.g. what things ‘go
together’) is broken-up into smaller pieces (evolu-
tion of developmental modularity or ecological
independence/community structure) and put together
into larger systems (evolution of developmental and
ecological dependencies), and ultimately re-scaled to
enable evolutionary adaptation to be reinstantiated at
a higher level of biological organisation (via evolu-
tionary transitions).
A summary of the unifying themes and their relation to
principles of connectionist learning is given in Table 1.
In the following sections we briefly discuss how our
work using this framework is beginning to answer the
motivating questions in evo-devo and evo-eco. We then
discuss our preliminary work on the evolution of new
evolutionary units and major transitions in more detail.
Developmental Organisation and Evolvability
Rupert Riedl, one of the founding pioneers of the field we
now know as evo-devo, suggested that body plans and
developmental constraints evolve to mimic the structure of
the constraints imposed on the phenotype by the environ-
ment (Riedl 1977; Wagner and Laubichler 2004). Only
recently has theoretical work caught-up with this intuitive
idea. Toussaint and von Seelen (2007) show that natural
selection necessarily favours phenotypic variation distri-
butions that are structurally similar to the pattern of
selection. Pavlicev et al. (2011) analyse the population
genetics of selection on an allele controlling the correlation
of two phenotypic traits. They show that it evolves under
natural selection to align phenotypic variation with the
direction of selection, such that if two traits are selected
together positive developmental correlations evolve, and if
one is selected for when the other is selected against neg-
ative developmental correlations evolve. This is
functionally equivalent to reinforcement correlation learn-
ing. In larger systems we see the same pattern occurring in
work where developmental interactions evolve modularity
that to mimics the modular structure of variation in a
selective environment (Lipson et al. 2002; Watson et al.
2014; Kashtan et al. 2009).
Building on these observations, our work shows that the
regulatory interactions of gene-regulation networks evolve
under natural selection in exactly the same manner as
correlation learning modifies the synaptic connections of a
neural network (Watson et al. 2014). This enables us to
show that gene-regulation networks can exhibit a ‘‘devel-
opmental memory’’ able to store and recall multiple phe-
notypes that have been selected for in the past, exactly like
the associative memory of a Hopfield network. Using
knowledge of how correlation learning can generalise over
a set of training patterns, we also showed that gene-net-
works can produce novel phenotypes that have not been
selected for in the past but have common structural regu-
larities (e.g. new combinations of phenotypic modules).
This provides a more formal basis with which to under-
stand Parter et al.’s results (2008) showing that genotype-
phenotype maps can generalise from past environments to
facilitate evolvability in novel environments.
The analogy between generalisation in learning systems
and evolvability in novel environments has considerable
technical depth. For example, generalisation in learning
systems is not mysterious, and accordingly, the evolution
of evolvability that facilitates long-term adaptation in
previously unseen environments is possible (Watson et al.
2010a; Kounios et al., in prep.). But neither is generalisa-
tion for granted in learning systems, and learning theory
can help us understand the capabilities and limitations of
such generalisation and evolvability in evolved systems. In
particular, in learning systems, overfitting occurs when
improved performance on the training set decreases gen-
eralisation on the test set. This is the analogue of past
selection that fails to facilitate future evolvability. How-
ever, conditions that alleviate overfitting and improve
generalisation in machine learning, such as the application
of a parsimony pressure that favours simple models, also
confer better generalisation in evolved G-P maps (e.g.
applied via a cost of connections; Clune et al. 2013)
(Kouvaris et al. 2015).
Organisation in Ecological Communities Without
Selection at the Community Level
Evolutionary processes exhibit different outcomes in
structured populations than they do in freely-mixed popu-
lations. Often, this is modelled with games played on
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networks (Jackson and Zenou 2014). Recently there has
been a rapid expansion of work investigating what happens
when agents on a network have behaviours that can alter
the topology of the network (Pacheco et al. 2006; Traulsen
et al. 2008; Van Segbroeck et al. 2010; Santos et al. 2006),
i.e. adaptive networks (Gross and Sayama 2009). Different
scenarios involve different assumptions about exactly how
agents modify their connections to others, but most cases
are consistent with the assumption that they change con-
nections to maximise their individual utility (e.g., leaving
connections unchanged when they are winning, and re-
wiring connections when they are losing; Nowak and
Sigmund 1993; Santos et al. 2006).
Usually these models are intended to represent the
interaction structure of a single population where nodes
represent individuals and edges represent fitness-affecting
interactions between individuals. If instead, we utilise a
network model to represent ecological interactions, then
nodes represent different species and edges represent eco-
logical fitness interactions between species. When the
network represents a single population, the reproduction of
an individual at one node may replace the individual of a
connected node (because they are members of the same
species). But in an ecological network this is not the case;
reproduction of individuals simply modifies the strategy of
the species at that node (and/or the connections the species
has with others). We have shown that a games-on-networks
model of this type behaves exactly like unsupervised cor-
relation learning (Davies et al. 2011; Watson et al. 2010a).
Moreover, since the total community welfare of a social
Table 1 Outline of a connectionist theoretical framework for the evolution of developmental, ecological and reproductive organisations
Component of
the Darwinian
Machine
Domain
a) variaon b) selecon c) inheritance
evo-devo
evolutionary 
developmental biology
evo-eco
evolutionary
ecology
evo-ego
evolutionary 
transitions in individuality
evo  org
Evolution of developmental 
constraints and biases/ 
morphological architecture 
organisation of phenotypic 
variability
Evolution of individual traits 
affecting ecological relationships 
with other species  the 
organisation of ecological 
selective pressures
Evolution of reproductive 
dependencies between 
evolutionary entities (e.g. vertical 
transmission of symbionts)  the 
heritability of collectives
Unit scale/
Selection level
Interactions within a single 
evolutionary unit 
(selection at system level) 
Interactions between multiple 
popns. of evolutionary units
(no selection at system level) 
Interactions change the scale of 
evolutionary unit
(selection moves from particles 
to collectives)
Unifying principle
(correlation
learning)
Genes that are selected 
together wire together
(e.g. by evolution of gene-
regulatory/developmental
interactions)
Species that are selected 
together wire together
(e.g. by evolution of ecological 
dependencies)
Units that are selected together 
wire together
(e.g., by evolution of reproductive 
co-dependencies, co-dispersal of 
symbiotic partners)
Analogous
learning theory
correlation learning
i.e. reinforce correlations that 
are good
unsupervised
correlation learning
i.e. reinforce correlations that 
are frequent
deep (multi-scale)
correlation learning
i.e. unsupervised learning at one 
scale reduces dimensionality of 
reinforcement learning at the next
feedback
(selection)
level
Performance feedback at 
system level 
(but credit assignment 
problem on particles)
Performance feedback at 
component level 
(but unsupervised at
system level)
Level of feedback changes 
through successive scales of 
organisation
The simple principle of positive feedback between behaviour on a network and changes in network topology, known as correlation learning in
neural networks, aka. ‘‘Neurons that fire together wire together’’, is analogous to the evolution of developmental, ecological and reproductive
organisations
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attractor is correlated with the basin size of the attractor,
the changes to connections produced under an individual
utility-maximisation principle have the emergent effect of
increasing global community welfare (collective fitness)
without selection at the system level (Davies et al. 2011;
Watson et al. 2010a)—as per a self-modelling dynamical
system.
We can also model the evolution of ecological organi-
sations in a more conventional Lotka-Volterra system
where a community matrix represents the network of
ecological interactions (Poderoso and Fontanari 2007;
Wilson 1992). We then let individuals within each species
carry traits that can modify their ecological interactions
with others under individual selection (i.e., in whatever
manner increases their representation within their own
species). This work shows that interactions evolve
according to the principles of unsupervised correlation
learning. This is consistent with character displacement
(Brown and Wilson 1956; Dayan and Simberloff 2005)
which alleviates competitive interactions or reinforces
mutualistic interactions in proportion to the contact a pair
of species has experienced. Accordingly, an ecosystem can
form a distributed associative memory of past environ-
mental conditions, storing and recalling multiple commu-
nity composition patterns in the resultant population
dynamics, despite the fact that there is no selection for such
behaviour at the system level (Power et al. 2015). This
suggests a significant expansion for the role of ecological
memory observed in natural ecosystems (Thompson et al.
2001) and provides the possibility of being able to char-
acterise the conditions under which eco-evo dynamics lead
to self-regulation/homeostasis rather than self-destruction
(Lenton 2004; Lenton and van Oijen 2002).
The evolution of New Evolutionary Units
Conventionally, it is assumed that the products of the
Darwinian machine do not alter how the machine operates,
i.e. that fixed mechanisms of variation and selection are
applied to a fixed reproductive unit. Above we have dis-
cussed how changes to developmental organisation and
ecological organisation can alter variation and selection.
But in an evolutionary transition, all three of these com-
ponent mechanisms (i.e., variation, selection and inheri-
tance) are transformed or re-created at a higher level of
organisation. This results in a Darwinian machine that
operates via heritable variation in reproductive success at a
higher level of biological organisation. There are many
complex issues involved, and the details are different in
different types of transition. Nonetheless, we discuss how
the basic positive feedback principle applies in this context,
i.e. evolutionary units that reproduce together (at the same
time or under the same conditions) become ‘wired’ toge-
ther into a new evolutionary unit, and how connectionist
learning principles help us understand the consequence of
this feedback in larger systems.
First, we discuss the evolutionary challenges involved in
different types of transition and, in particular, collectives
containing particles of complementary functional types.
We explain why coordinating these complementary func-
tional types is fundamental to creating fitness differences
that belong to the collective. Second, we discuss our work
thus far in the evolution of pairwise relationships, and
third, our preliminary work on the evolution of new
reproductive units in larger networks.
The Evolutionary Challenges in Egalitarian
and Fraternal Transitions
Types of Transitions
Evolutionary transitions can be classified into two types
(Queller 1997):
• Fraternal transitions, e.g., the transition to multi-
cellularity, involve controlled aggregations of related
individuals (‘like kinds’). Their origination is motivated
primarily by economies of scale. This involves the
evolution of traits that modify relatedness by evolving
parameters of population structure that control the
amount of mixing (such as initial group size/life cycle
bottleneck size, germline segregation, dispersal param-
eters/time in groups) (Jackson and Watson 2013;
Powers et al. 2011; Ryan et al. 2015; Johnson and
Gaines 1990) and hence the likelihood of meeting
others like oneself (assortment).
• Egalitarian transitions, e.g., the symbiotic origin of
eukaryote organelles (Margulis and Fester 1991; Mar-
gulis 1993) and the origin of chromosomes (Maynard
Smith and Szathma´ry 1993), involve the union of
previously unrelated lineages (‘unlike kinds’). Their
origination is motivated primarily by the provision of
complementary functions (Bouchard and Huneman
2013). This involves the evolution of reproductive
mechanisms that change the co-dispersal of lineages
(e.g. changing from horizontal to vertical transmission
of symbionts), linking lineages that were previously
inherited independently such that they are subsequently
inherited together.
These differences suggest that these types of transition
do not share common mechanisms or motives (Queller
1997). However, both types of transition, when considered
more fully, involve both a change in the level of the evo-
lutionary unit (from particles to collectives) and the orig-
ination of heterogeneous functional roles, but in different
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orders (Fig. 1). In egalitarian transitions, evolutionary
entities differentiate functional roles first (e.g. via specia-
tion) and then form a new evolutionary unit, whereas in
fraternal transitions, entities change the scale of the evo-
lutionary unit first and then differentiate in their functional
roles. Both types of transition thereby result in higher-level
groups with internally differentiated roles, and organisa-
tional changes controlling the diversification of roles and
changes in the level of selection are involved in both types
of transition. In egalitarian transitions this diversification of
roles and the coexistence of complementary types (occur-
ring before the transition) involves changes in relationships
that are ecological—i.e. between multiple existing evolu-
tionary units. In fraternal transitions the diversification of
roles (occurring after the transition in the evolutionary unit)
involves changes in relationships that are developmental—
i.e. within a single unit of selection. The evolution of
organisational networks is central in both cases, however.
An important difference between fraternal and egalitarian
transitions is that in the differentiate-first egalitarian case
the differentiation of roles can be controlled by the original
inheritance mechanism (e.g. mitochondria are different
from the nucleus because they have their own genetic
lineages), whereas in the differentiate-second fraternal
case, the differentiation of roles must be controlled by a
new inheritance system (e.g. liver cells are different from
skin cells because of their epigenetic states) (Jablonka
1994; Jablonka and Lamb 2006).
The observation that all transitions involve both changes
in the level of evolutionary unit and diversification of roles
is logical given what is required to instantiate the Dar-
winian machine at a higher-level of organisation, in par-
ticular, the suppression of fitness differences at one level of
organisation and the creation of heritable variability that
confers fitness differences at another (Clarke 2010, Ryan,
in prep.). Much work on the evolution of individuality
focusses on factors that suppress fitness differences
between particles within a collective in order to prevent
particle competition within groups from subverting group
heritability (Okasha 2006; Bourke 2011). For example, the
origin of multicellularity (in most cases) involves the
evolution of a population bottleneck and sequestration of
the germ line that creates high-relatedness among particles
within a collective and facilitates high frequencies of
cooperative particles (Godfrey-Smith 2009; Buss 1987;
Okasha 2006). But this is only one aspect of a transition. It
Fig. 1 Two dimensions of change in evolutionary transitions.
Fraternal transitions (e.g. to multicellularity) involve first a change
in the level of selection, then diversification of functional roles within
this new unit (1 ? 2a ? 3). Egalitarian transitions (e.g. to eukaryote
cells with organelles) involve first a diversification of functional roles
between multiple units then a change in the level of selection
(1 ? 2b ? 3). Whereas conventional views of the transitions focus
on changes in the level of selection (vertical axis), this view
emphasises how the evolution of developmental and ecological
relationships (horizontal axis) creates organisations that govern the
complex phenotype of the new unit/collective. This coordination of
diverse functional roles between particles within a collective is
essential to create fitness differences between collectives whilst
simultaneously eliminating or suppressing fitness differences between
particles
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is also necessary that these cooperative particles have the
capability to take on heterogeneous roles in the group
phenotype (Jablonka 1994; Jablonka and Lamb 2006),
enabling fitness advantages to arise from the coordination
of those roles (e.g. via division of labour). In multicellular
organisms this is facilitated by epigenetic differentiation
that enables cells to adopt heterogeneous phenotypes
despite being genetically homogeneous (Jablonka 1994;
Jablonka and Lamb 2006). This separation of genotype
from phenotype (i.e. requiring a plastic developmental
process) is necessary to create a situation where fitness
variance within collectives can be suppressed without also
eliminating fitness variance between collectives (Tudge
et al. 2013; Jablonka and Lamb 2006). That is, for there to
be selection at a higher level there must be fitness differ-
ences between collectives, yet collectives must contain
particles that all have the same replication rate (to prevent
individual selection from undermining the collective). If
collectives only contain one type of particle (i.e. fraternal),
then this removes within-collective variation but also
makes it more difficult after the transition for descendent
collectives to be different from each other (unless particles
have coordinated plastic phenotypes). Conversely, if col-
lectives contain more than one type of particle (i.e. egali-
tarian), then descendent collectives can be different
because of the particular combinations or arrangement of
particles they contain but selection on within-collective
variation must be controlled (e.g. by ‘policing’ mitochon-
drial replication).
Fitness Differences that Belong to the Collective
In order to identify natural selection at a new level of
organisation we want to distinguish it from changes that are
driven by natural selection at the existing (lower) level of
organisation (Okasha 2006). Only if collective interests and
particle interests act in opposition to one another could an
adaptation be observed at the collective level that could not
be explained as the result of adaptation at the particle level.
However, at the same time, it seems counter intuitive to
assert that particles belonging to fit collectives must be
individually unfit. Indeed, we might expect that the fitness
of a particle might be directly derived by its membership in
a fit collective—implying that particle fitness is propor-
tional to collective fitness, and collective fitness is a linear
sum of particle fitness. There are conflicting ideas here that
need to be disentangled. Let us first make the issues more
concrete with an example.
Consider an example where particles attain fitness
benefits by having phenotypes that are coordinated with
the phenotypes of others (complementary roles), rather
than benefits that arise from their intrinsic individual
characteristics. For example, suppose that a proto-
multicellular organism must be both motile (in order to
gather resources to survive) and fecund, and that individual
cells cannot be in the motile state and in the reproductive
state simultaneously (Solari et al. 2006). Both roles might
be provided initially in a single-celled organism via phe-
notypic plasticity and a lifecycle that moves reversibly
between one state and the other. But if two cells work
together to allow specialisation in these roles, there are
efficiencies to be gained in, for example, the time and
energy required to switch between phenotypic states.
Clearly, the fitness of an immotile reproductive cell or a
non-reproductive motile cell alone may be zero. But the
fitness of cells that belong to a collective (of two) with
complementary roles is non-zero (for the non-reproductive
cell, it is its inclusive fitness that is relevant; Ryan, in
prep.). Accordingly, their individual fitness in this case is
not depressed in order to serve the fitness of the collective;
quite the opposite, they are fit because they belong to a fit
collective (Ryan, in prep.). Yet, if collective and individual
fitnesses are in alignment, this seems to undermine the
significance of adaptation at the collective level (Okasha
2006).
Okasha (2006) points to the resolution. Specifically,
even if collective fitness is a linear sum of particle fitnesses,
collective fitness can nonetheless be a non-linear function
of particle phenotypes. In the previous example, the
reproductive cell state is a phenotype that has a fitness that
can be very high or very low depending on whether the
other cell in the partnership adopts the motile cell state or
reproductive cell state, respectively. The cell phenotypes
thus have a highly non-linear relationship to collective
fitness, but individual fitness (fitness of the particle, not
fitness of the particle-phenotype) may nonetheless be pro-
portional to collective fitness. Thus when particles have
diverse, potentially synergistic, functional roles, good
coordination between them can create fitness benefits at the
collective level that cannot be accounted for by phenotypes
that confer fitness differences at the individual level. It is
thus the coordination ability itself that is both fit for the
particle and fit for the collective, whereas neither of the two
cell-phenotypes are individually fit (more exactly, fitness
differences between these particle phenotypes do not
explain the fitness differences that can arise between col-
lectives). Accordingly, the ability to coordinate particle
phenotypes with one another is not just a useful ‘add-on’ in
evolutionary transitions, but actually essential in creating
fitness differences that belong to the collective and not to
the lower level of biological organisation. Accordingly, the
evolution of individual particle phenotypes is inadequate to
explain collective-level adaptations, and it is in exactly this
case where a connectionist approach, i.e. addressing the
evolution of relationships that coordinate particle pheno-
types, comes into its own. In egalitarian transitions this
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requires coordinating the reproduction and inheritance of
diverse types within collectives. In fraternal transitions this
requires particles that are plastic; capable of producing
more than one phenotype, i.e. a context-sensitive devel-
opmental process, possibly including parental effects
(Tudge et al., submitted, Tudge et al. 2013).
Minimal Formal Models of ‘Coordinated Functional
Roles’
Collective fitness thus requires the presence of more than
one mutually-exclusive particle phenotypes that are com-
plementary or synergistic (e.g. specialisation in surviv-
ability and fecundity). Let us denote these particle
phenotypes as 0 and 1, such that collective phenotypes may
be 00, 01, 10, or 11 (01 and 10 may have the same fitness).
For each of these particles, neither the 0 phenotype nor the
1 phenotype is successful on its own, nor is it any more fit
than the other phenotype on average over the possible
contexts provided by the other particle. Nonetheless, by
evolving to coordinate particle phenotypes (or anti-coor-
dinate them) a collective containing complementary parti-
cles may be fitter than other collectives. This will thereby
confer a fitness benefit to the particles it contains even
though these fitness benefits cannot be attributed to either
particle phenotype. In machine learning, a function with
this property is called a non-linearly separable function—
and is a well-known touchstone in neural learning test
cases. The non-linearly separable functions for two Boo-
lean variables are logical XOR (inequality, 01 or 10) and
IFF (equality, 00 and 11). Other functions do not have this
property. For example, under logical AND (11), a 0 phe-
notype is never superior to a 1 phenotype, but a 1 pheno-
type is superior to a 0 phenotype in some contexts (i.e.
contexts where the other particle is a 1); accordingly,
particle-level selection alone can produce the 11 collective.
Interestingly, when groups are built of individuals from
two different species (i.e. egalitarian transitions), XOR and
IFF are logically isomorphic because the labelling of each
variable (0 or 1) is arbitrary and independent of the other.
But when groups are built of two instantiations of the same
individual (i.e. fraternal transition) IFF is trivially easy to
satisfy and XOR is not. For equality (IFF), duplication of
an individual of either type that passes through a single-cell
bottleneck, or some other mechanism that enforces genetic
assortment, is sufficient. But inequality (XOR) is not so
simple in fraternal groups. Which is just to say that groups
of heterogeneous phenotypes cannot be built from homo-
geneous genotypes unless there is also some mechanism of
context-sensitive differentiation (e.g. plasticity).
These distinctions can also be formalised in game the-
oretic terms. In conventional social dilemmas, such as the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Snowdrift game or the Stag Hunt,
the social composition that maximises community welfare
is 100 % cooperation (a homogeneous collective). In
contrast, in division of labour games, the community
welfare of a group is maximised by a particular combina-
tion of multiple strategies (Tudge et al. 2013; Tudge et al.,
submitted). This kind of social dilemma cannot be solved
by genetic assortment alone (i.e. homogenous groups);
some form of developmental process, through which par-
ticles may coordinate with one another to adopt comple-
mentary roles (West-Eberhard 2003; Jablonka 1994), is
required to solve this type of dilemma (Tudge et al.,
submitted).
How Evolution Changes the Evolutionary Unit
Given this view of the evolutionary challenges involved in
an evolutionary transition, next we want to understand the
conditions under which natural selection acting on the
existing, i.e. lower, evolutionary units will meet these
challenges. First we address how the action of natural
selection modifies the evolutionary unit in dilemmas that
can be resolved by positive assortment or homogeneous
groups (e.g. the first stage of a fraternal transition). Then
we address a minimal case of heterogeneous groups, i.e.
two-player division of labour games, given particles with
plastic phenotypes, as per a fraternal transition with mini-
mal diversification of roles. This describes our work on
social niche construction. For homogeneous groups, scal-
ing-up to larger collectives is unproblematic. In contrast,
for groups with multiple heterogeneous functional roles, it
becomes necessary to describe the evolution of reproduc-
tive relationships in a network. Our models thus far address
how natural selection modifies the evolutionary unit in
networks of genetically heterogeneous components, i.e.
egalitarian transitions. This work illustrates how the posi-
tive feedback principle, in common with the feedback in
developmental and ecological networks, also applies to the
evolution of reproductive relationships.
Social Niche Construction
Social evolution theory explains the evolution of cooper-
ation by showing that strategy assortment makes coopera-
tors fitter than defectors even when the reverse is true in a
well-mixed population (Frank 1998; Bourke 2011). Social
assortment (where similar phenotypes meet one another
with higher probability than would be expected from their
global frequency) and relatedness (where similar genotypes
meet one another with higher probability than would be
expected from their global frequency; Michod and
Hamilton 1980) are exogenous parameters to this type of
explanation (Ryan et al. 2015). In natural populations,
however, there are many ways in which individual
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characters affect strategy assortment (e.g. seed dispersal
radii, quorum sensing dispersal behaviours, habitat pref-
erences, context-sensitive phenotypes) (Powers et al.
2011). We seek to endogenise parameters affecting popu-
lation structures and genetic assortment into evolutionary
explanations; to thereby explain the evolution of coopera-
tion at a deeper level. For example, instead of concluding
that cooperation prevails because genotypes are positively
assorted, we ask why population structures that provide
such genetic assortment evolved—and in particular, whe-
ther these structures evolved precisely because they
enabled greater cooperation.
Social niche construction (Powers 2010) thus studies the
concurrent evolution of social behaviours with behaviours
that modify the social niche, e.g. via traits that modify
population structure (Powers et al. 2011; Powers 2010;
Ryan et al. 2015). This work shows various conditions
under which group structure that supports cooperation can
evolve under individual natural selection (Szathma´ry
2011). In game theoretic terms, one way to formalise this
feedback is with the concept of a meta-game, i.e. where
individuals have traits that modify the game they are
playing, in addition to social strategies (Jackson and
Watson 2013; Jackson and Watson, submitted; Jackson
2011; Doncaster et al. 2013). This work enables us to
characterise the conditions under which individual natural
selection can transform social interactions to remove a
social dilemma (moving the effective game from a Pris-
oner’s Dilemma to a Harmony Game, for example) and
enabling cooperation to prevail (Jackson and Watson,
submitted). This is a simple example of a feedback
between a social structure and a social behaviour, echoing
the other examples of feedback between an evolutionary
process and the parameters of that process we have dis-
cussed. We find that natural selection can, via social niche
construction, increase the level of cooperation in a popu-
lation (e.g. by evolving group size in the direction that
favours cooperation).
However, this does not necessarily demonstrate a new
evolutionary unit that exhibits heritable variation at the
collective level. This depends on whether we are modelling
a type-1 or type-2 group selection process (Okasha 2006;
Wilson 1989). In type-1 group selection, individual fitness
is affected by a group context but groups do not have
heritable lineages. Here reproduction of groups may be via
an aggregation and dispersal process, where individuals
reproduce via a migrant pool (Maynard Smith 1964). In
type-2 group selection models, groups do have herita-
ble lineages and fitness is thus meaningful at the group
level. Here, group reproduction may be via a group-fis-
sioning process or propagule reproduction such as in the
stochastic corrector model (Szathma´ry and Demeter 1987).
In both cases, social niche construction can change the
balance of particle-level and group-level selection by, for
example, modifying the initial size of groups (Powers et al.
2011), or the initial size of group propagules (Ryan et al.
2015, Ryan, in prep.). But the latter is particularly relevant
to the evolution of individuality at a new level of organi-
sation because only in this case do collectives have lin-
eages and heritable properties (Ryan et al. 2015; Ryan, in
prep.). In this case (unlike the migrant pool model) it is
possible to show that collectives exhibit heritable variation
in reproductive success and that this increases over evo-
lutionary time via social niche construction.
Those works have addressed conventional social
dilemmas that are resolved by positive assortment (genetic
and phenotypic). Other work is investigating social niche
construction in models that address division of labour
games and fraternal transitions. These models ask when
individual natural selection (on the original evolutionary
units) will utilise phenotypic plasticity, and when it will
utilise context sensitive plasticity (e.g. parental effects), on
the assumption that these characteristics are controlled by
particle genotypes. We find that positive genetic assortment
alone does not resolve such dilemmas, but positive genetic
assortment is necessary to enable the evolution of nega-
tively-assorted phenotypes via plasticity. This is because
this scenario creates a new (conventional) social dilemma
on genotypes between ‘co-operators’ that have the ability
to coordinate phenotypes correctly, and defectors that do
not. Purging such defectors is a proviso for the evolution of
negative phenotypic assortment, i.e., the expression of
complementary functional roles via phenotypic plasticity
(Tudge et al. 2013; Tudge et al., submitted). Accordingly,
positive genetic assortment creates a situation where an
allele that produces coordinated phenotypic differentiation
is then favoured and can thereby maximise collective fit-
ness (Tudge et al., submitted).
Encapsulating pairs of particle-phenotypes into a new
evolutionary unit causes them to be reproduced as an
indivisible pair (i.e. one particle-phenotype cannot repro-
duce without the other if particle reproduction is appro-
priately policed or if the two particle phenotypes share the
same genotype). Like the connections in the deep optimi-
sation model, this changes the way combinations of parti-
cles are substituted under selection. For example, suppose a
11 pair (e.g. cooperative pair) has higher collective fitness
than a 00 pair (e.g. defect pair). Before a transition, a 11
pair cannot competitively exclude a 00 pair because when
particles reproduce as individuals, 01 pairs will also be
created and individual selection favours 0 in this case. Put
differently, before the transition the pair is not the relevant
evolutionary unit. But after the transition, 11 can compet-
itively exclude 00 when reproducing as a unit because it
has higher collective fitness. Thus by eliminating fitness
differences within groups, the remaining effect of selection
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derives entirely from between-group selection, i.e. the
relevant evolutionary unit is now the pair. Putting together
the ideas of social niche construction with a minimal
demonstration of the between-group selection it enables,
we show that individual selection creates groups that
facilitate higher-level adaptation (Snowdon et al. 2011).
This is analogous to the jumps in configuration space that
are facilitated by the new units in deep optimisation.
These works (and others, Ghang and Nowak 2014;
Szathma´ry 2011) indicate that it is possible to endogenise
the evolution of reproductive organisations into evolu-
tionary theory (Ryan et al. 2015). We find that when nat-
ural selection is given the chance to do so, at least in small
systems (e.g. a single pairwise relationship between two
particles), it favours reproductive organisations that follow
correlation learning principles—either reinforcing positive
correlations or negative correlations, depending on what
the social game requires. The new evolutionary units thus
created can change evolutionary outcomes by creating
selection that operates at the collective level rather than the
particle level.
Scaling-up From Pairwise Relationships to Networks
In dilemmas that are solved by positive assortment, it is
easy to imagine that economies of scale provide even
greater benefits to larger collectives (greater than size two).
But scaling-up from pairwise relationships to large num-
bers of particles is more challenging when it involves
complementary functional roles. Intuitively, homogeneity
scales easily, but heterogeneity does not—there are many
ways to be different and organising these differences is, for
example, what makes multi-cellular organisms interest-
ingly different from simple colonies of cells.
In large heterogeneous systems, the relevant question
changes from ‘how do individuals create reproductive
structures that change the level of selection?’ (e.g. by social
niche construction) to ‘given that individuals can create
reproductive structures that change the level of selection,
which individuals do so and with whom?’ Here our work
focusses on egalitarian transitions where genetically
diverse particles are placed together into a new reproduc-
tive unit. This work seeks to identify conditions where
particle-level natural selection is successful in creating new
evolutionary units that are fit given that there is variation in
the membership of such units. The evolution of such units
or partnerships enables individual natural selection to
control which individuals reproduce independently and
which are ‘in the same boat’, i.e. which individuals have
shared reproductive fate/create a single vertical lineage. A
particle that forms such a reproductive partnership must
forgo within-collective fitness differences but may gain
fitness differences at the collective level through the
combinations of multiple diverse types that are enabled by
these units.
Our early work in this area used a simple approach. It
created higher-level evolutionary units at random and let
natural selection retain those that were adaptive (Watson
2006; Watson and Pollack 2002). The symbiotic evolu-
tionary adaptation model could correctly identify which
composite units corresponded to sub-problems in a com-
binatorial optimisation problem (Watson 2006). However,
this approach did not scale well. In short, there are too
many possible partnerships to try and there are many
partnerships that are far from optimal but fitter than not
having a partnership at all. This makes it very difficult for
selection to find partnerships that enable effective adapta-
tion at higher levels of organisation. This is analogous to
the problem of how supervised learning under-determines
intermediate representations in deep correlation learning—
there are many intermediate representations that locally
improve the output but are not optimal for the higher-level
task.
In hindsight, we were missing a trick; this work over-
looked the value of unsupervised correlation learning in
reducing the dimensionality of the search space before new
units are created. More recent work rectifies this by
exploiting principles of unsupervised learning introduced
into the new approaches to deep learning. This uses indi-
vidual-based simulations where, as before, individuals have
traits that define symbiotic partnerships controlling who
they co-disperse with during reproduction, thus creating
new heritable units. But this is now combined with eco-
logical dynamics (particle level selection) such that selec-
tion for new evolutionary units occurs mostly at local
ecological equilibria. Under these conditions, new evolu-
tionary units that join two species together must be at least
as good as the combinations of species that already co-
occur under individual selection at ecological equilibria—
otherwise individuals that are not partnered will be fitter.
By occasionally perturbing the ecological dynamics, we
cause the system to visit many different ecological equi-
libria, and under these conditions, only partnerships that
are robust over the distribution of ecological equilibria
visited will survive selection. Accordingly, the partnerships
that are favoured by selection are those that evolve to
canalise the combinations of species that already co-occur
most frequently under particle-level selection. This
implements the unsupervised correlation learning principle,
i.e. evolutionary units that reproduce together (at the same
ecological equilibria) become ‘wired’ together into new
evolutionary units. This greatly reduces the number of
partnerships that are favoured under individual selection,
and these more stringent selective conditions prove to be
extremely effective in focussing selection onto partnerships
that are adaptive (Watson et al. 2009a, b; Watson et al.,
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submitted). The partnerships that evolve under these con-
ditions subsequently enable groups of species to invade
ecological equilibria as a unit, allowing the ecological
dynamics to jump out of local equilibria and thereby find
new ecological equilibria of higher collective fitness.
Again, this is analogous to the jumps in configuration
space that are facilitated by the new units in deep optimi-
sation. In the size-two collectives of the previous section,
the computational optimisation capabilities of forming new
units are not significant; assuming that there is herita-
ble variability in the membership of egalitarian groups,
forming groups at random would be sufficient to find
groups that maximise collective welfare. In these larger
systems, this is not the case. Forming large collectives at
random is not sufficient to find collectives with high col-
lective welfare. Moreover, incrementally modifying the
membership of groups is not sufficient to find collectives
with high collective welfare even when selection is
enforced at the collective level (Watson et al., in prep.,
Watson et al. 2009a, b). In other words, finding fit col-
lectives is a computationally difficult problem that cannot
be solved by selection at the particle level nor by simply
enforcing selection at the global level. However, under the
selective conditions described, implementing deep opti-
misation with unsupervised learning principles, natural
selection picks out particular subsets of species that have
synergistic fitness interactions to form new units. This
enables these intermediate-sized units to invade as a unit
and competitively exclude other subsets of species (even if
those species are not favoured under individual selection).
This enables the evolving ecosystem to rescale the evolu-
tionary process, and thereby find larger collectives with
especially high collective fitness, and so on. This multi-
scale process enables natural selection to find solutions that
cannot be found by single-level evolutionary processes at
either the individual or global level (Watson et al. 2009a,
b).
How Does Lower-Level Selection ‘Anticipate’ Which
Partnerships Will Facilitate Upper-Level Adaptation?
The reason that these partnerships evolve is not, and cannot
be, because they will enable effective adaptation in future.
These partnerships evolve because they are the partner-
ships that exhibit the immediate fitness benefits of robust-
ness. Specifically, partnerships between particles that
already frequently co-occur under particle-level selection
are close to neutral with respect to their effect on collective
fitness (i.e. they are partnerships between types that already
co-occur). Nonetheless, it is exactly these partnerships that
later enable selection at the collective level to escape local
optima and discover higher fitness solutions. We can
understand why this is the case by analogy with deep
learning and deep optimisation: partnerships that amplify
existing correlations reduce the dimensionality of the
search space in a non-arbitrary way. The evolution of
reproductive correlations under individual selection, shown
in these models, has the effect of canalising combinations
of particles that commonly co-occur at social equilibria.
This occurs without any information about what combi-
nations of particles will be adaptive at the higher level of
selection that is thus created. By mimicking the structure of
co-occurrence produced at ecological equilibria in this
way, the evolution of new reproductive relationships is
analogous to the use of unsupervised learning to reduce the
dimensionality of a data set in deep optimisation. Optimi-
sation algorithms inspired by this multi-scale process
resulted in the technique of multi-scale search (Mills et al.
2014) which is able to solve formally difficult optimisation
problems that provably cannot be solved by conventional
(i.e. single scale) evolutionary models.
Taken together these models suggest that ‘deep evolu-
tion’, involving transitions through multiple scales of bio-
logical organisation, implements a sort of multi-scale
correlation learning machine, or deep optimisation, that is
quite different from the conventional micro-evolutionary
(i.e. hill-climbing) model of evolutionary adaptation
(Watson 2012).
Integration
Our work illustrates several different but complementary
processes by which the Darwinian Machine changes as a
result of its own products. The evolution of developmental
networks modifies the distribution of phenotypic variants
that selection can act on, and the evolution of ecological
networks modifies the selection acting on those variants.
The major evolutionary transitions involve more radical
transformations in the underlying processes of the Dar-
winian Machine. We have illustrated several of the com-
ponents that are involved in a mechanistic account of such
transitions in separate models. Our models of social niche
construction consider small collectives (pairwise games)
and larger homogeneous collectives. Our work on large
heterogeneous collectives thus far address complementary
research questions by assuming that social niche con-
struction capable of instantiating higher-level evolutionary
units of genetically heterogeneous units is provided. A
more integrated model should bring these works together.
Our models also do not yet attempt to address fraternal
transitions in large collectives of many functional roles.
Further, it would be desirable to present a model where
particles have the evolutionary option to employ mecha-
nisms that either create egalitarian or fraternal transitions
(or potentially a mixture of the two). This would enable us
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to examine the conditions under which natural selection
takes different routes through the space described in Fig. 1.
From greater perspective, although the work on the
evolution of developmental and ecological organisations
has theoretical and conceptual unifying themes, we do not
yet have a model that integrates changes in developmental,
ecological and reproductive organisations freely in the
same model. This would be ambitious, of course, but we
believe that this is necessary to properly understand the
interaction of developmental and ecological organisations
in the major transitions (Fig. 1). In an egalitarian transition,
the relationships between the diverse components are
originally ecological relationships, i.e. between multiple
species. After the transition, these ecological relationships
are encapsulated within a new single unit (O’Toole et al.
2000; Bouchard and Huneman 2013), but the original
functional roles and particle-level selection dynamics are
retained within the new unit, at least initially. In a fraternal
transition, e.g. the transition to multicellularity, the tran-
sition to a new unit occurs before functional roles diversify.
Thus the functional relationships between these different
types are ‘developmental’ from the outset, i.e. within a
single evolutionary unit. However, such transitions create a
new ‘internal selection’ ecology implemented in a new
inheritance system, e.g., during ontogenesis, different cell
types grow into tissues through (context sensitive) repli-
cation of epigenetic states (Jablonka 1994; Laland et al.
2014; Huang et al. 2005). The population dynamics of
these cell populations is affected by inter-cellular interac-
tions and competition for resources within the embryo that
determine which types grow where, when and how much
(Buss 1987). Accordingly, either changes in ecological
organisations (capable of controlling inter-specific depen-
dencies to enable co-existence of complementary func-
tions), or changes in developmental organisations (capable
of controlling phenotypic plasticity to coordinate differ-
ential growth of particle phenotypes with one another), are
necessary components of evolutionary transitions. An
integrated model of these dynamics, enabling the bottom-
up evolution of new evolutionary units through successive
scales of organisation, remains as the ambitious aim of this
research programme.
Conclusions
Connectionism recognises that the cleverness of cognition
does not derive from the cleverness of the individual neural
parts but from the organisation of the relationships between
them. We have introduced the term evolutionary connec-
tionism to recognise that, in the same way, evolutionary
innovation need not originate from the adaptation of the
evolutionary parts per se but from the evolution of the
relationships between them. We have argued that this is
much more than a superficial analogy between learning and
evolution. Specific, but simple, organisational principles
are common to correlation learning systems and the evo-
lution of organisations. Selection for correlations that
improve fitness at the system level (the evolution of
developmental organisation) is equivalent to reinforcement
correlation learning mechanisms. And when selection for
correlations that improve fitness at the component level
(the evolution of ecological organisations) act to stabilise
the system state this is equivalent to unsupervised corre-
lation learning at the system level. In an evolutionary
transition, where the level of selection changes from one
scale of organisation to another higher level of organisa-
tion, the ecological attractors reinforced by unsupervised
learning are converted into developmental attractors of the
new unit. Then, by evolving new interactions with other
units at this higher level, they may enact an unsupervised
correlation learning process at the next level of organisa-
tion, and so on. This deep evolution process shares algo-
rithmic properties with deep correlation learning, and
optimisation techniques based on these principles (multi-
scale search, deep optimisation) have adaptive capabilities
that are in a provably different class from conventional
single-scale microevolution.
These connections with learning theory suggest that the
special problems of each biological domain have solutions.
Specifically, they suggest that;
(a) In evo-devo, it is not impossible for short-term
selection to discover developmental organisations
that facilitate future evolution. This can occur in the
same way, and with the same limitations, as the
ability of correlation learning to generalise from past
data to perform well on previously unseen data. This
requires the ability to form a model of the data (e.g. a
correlation model) that captures structural regulari-
ties that are invariant over time, even if superficial
structures are novel. This provides a formal basis for
the evolution of evolvability.
(b) In evo-eco, it is not impossible for a community to
be organised to reflect the structural properties of its
environment (e.g. the structure of abiotic, constraints
and resources in which the ecological community
resides) without selection at the community level.
This can occur in the same way, and with the same
limitations, as the process by which unsupervised
correlation learning learns the structure of a data set
without performance feedback. Such an organisation
arises as a consequence of selection at the level of
individuals within component species, and facilitates
system stability and robustness to perturbations (if
the perturbations have similar structure to those
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experienced in the past) even though there is no
notion of Darwinian fitness at the system level. This
provides a formal basis for the evolution of com-
munity organisation without community selection.
(c) In evo-ego, it is not impossible for natural selection
to favour reproductive organisations that facilitate
higher-level adaptation before evolutionary units at
that higher level exist. This can occur in the same
way, and with the same limitations, as the way in
which unsupervised learning can reduce the dimen-
sionality of a problem in deep learning even though
it has no performance metric that knows what the
new representation might be used for at the next
level of organisation. This implies that the evolu-
tionary transitions may not be simply a collection of
extraordinary accidents (even though each has its
own unique features) but the result of systematic
adaptive processes.
Although we argue that it is not impossible for biolog-
ical systems to exhibit such behaviours, clearly they do not
always do so. Our aim in making these connections with
learning theory is so that we have potential to identify the
conditions when biological systems will produce these
behaviours and when they will not (Watson and Szathma´ry,
2015). For example, the transfer of learning theory to evo-
devo suggests that the evolution of evolvability will be
sensitive to the match between the deep structural regu-
larities of the environment and the intrinsic inductive bia-
ses of developmental processes (i.e. the kind of regularities
that are easy to ‘learn’ in that ‘model space’), and to the
costs and benefits of ‘overfitting’ the environment (Kou-
nios et al., in prep., Kouvaris et al. 2015). The transfer of
learning theory to evo-eco suggests that the evolution of
community organisation will be sensitive to the presence of
ecological constraints that cause species to coevolve
dependencies with one another rather than simply evolve
toward independence (Power et al. 2015). And the transfer
of learning theory to evo-ego suggests that the evolution of
new evolutionary units will exhibit limitations analogous to
those of deep learning.
Together the evolution of developmental, ecological and
reproductive organisations modifies the mechanisms of
variation, selection and inheritance that drive evolution by
natural selection. The evolutionary connectionism frame-
work sheds light on how the Darwinian Machine can
thereby be rescaled from one level of biological organisa-
tion to another. The results thus far demonstrate that con-
nectionist learning principles provide a productive
methodological approach to important biological questions
and offer numerous new insights that expand our under-
standing of evolutionary processes (Watson and Szathma´ry
2015). Regardless of how the exact alignment between the
evolutionary and learning models discussed in this paper
develops with future research, the algorithmic territory
covered by learning algorithms is, we argue, the right
conceptual territory for developing our understanding of
how evolutionary processes change over evolutionary time
(Watson and Szathma´ry 2015).
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